Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

State v. Arnold

Court of Appeals of Oregon

January 2, 2020

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TINA MICHELLE ARNOLD, aka Tina Arnold, Defendant-Appellant.

          Submitted November 26, 2019.

          Multnomah County Circuit Court 18CN02084 Kathryn L. Villa-Smith, Judge.

          Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public Services, fled the brief for appellant.

          Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Lauren P. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, fled the brief for respondent.

          Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Sercombe, Senior Judge.

         Case Summary:

         Defendant appeals a judgment of contempt, ORS 33.015 (2)(b). Defendant was found in contempt for violating an Elderly Persons and Persons with Disabilities Abuse Prevention Act (EPPDAPA) restraining order, ORS 124.005 to 124.040, that had prohibited defendant entering or attempting to enter J's home. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal and finding that she "willfully" violated the restraining order, as is required for a finding of contempt under ORS 33.015(2)(b), because the order did not correctly name her. Held: When a defendant is personally served with a restraining order and has notice that the order applies to her, a defendant may not violate the order and then collaterally attack the validity of the order in a subsequent contempt proceeding. The record contained sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find that defendant knew that the order applied to her and restrained her from entering or attempting to enter J's residence and, thus, that the violation of the order was done "willfully." Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and found defendant in contempt.

         Affirmed.

         [301 Or.App. 643] TOOKEY, P. J.

         Defendant appeals a judgment of contempt, ORS 33.015(2)(b).[1] Defendant was found in contempt for violating a restraining order issued under the Elderly Persons and Persons with Disabilities Abuse Prevention Act (EPPDAPA), ORS 124.005 to 124.040. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) and concluding that there was sufficient evidence that she "willfully" violated the restraining order, as required for a finding of contempt under ORS 33.015(2)(b). Defendant argues that she did not willfully violate the restraining order because it did not correctly name her. We hold that, when a defendant is personally served with a restraining order and has notice that the order applies to her, a defendant may not violate the order and then collaterally attack the validity of the underlying order in a subsequent contempt proceeding. Here, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find that defendant had notice that the order applied to her and restrained her from entering or attempting to enter the petitioner's residence, and, thus, the violation of the order was "done willfully." ORS 33.015(2). Accordingly, we affirm.

         We "review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on punitive contempt to determine whether the record contains evidence from which a rational trier of fact, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state, could find all elements of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Graham, 251 Or.App. 217, 218, 284 P.3d 515 (2012). In accordance with that standard of review, we recite the material facts in the light most favorable to the state.

         Defendant's name is Tina Arnold. Defendant was married to F Ball, but defendant did not legally change her last name to Ball.

         [301 Or.App. 644] J is defendant's father-in-law, and defendant lived at J's residence. J knew defendant "[a] little by Arnold but [mostly by the name] Ball because of the marriage" to J's step son, F Ball. In April 2018, J obtained a restraining order against defendant that prohibited "Tina Ball" from willfully entering or attempting to enter J's residence. See ORS 124.010(1)(b) (an elderly person subject to abuse within the preceding 180 days may petition for relief if the abuser presents an immediate and present danger of further abuse). Leahy, a deputy with the Multnomah County Sheriffs Office, personally served defendant with that restraining order at the residence that defendant shared with J. See ORS 124.022(1) ("A sheriff may serve a restraining order issued under ORS 124.020U"). When Leahy served defendant with the restraining order, he provided defendant with a copy of the restraining order, the restraining order petition, and a notice to defendant that she could request a hearing to contest the order. After serving defendant with the order, Leahy told defendant that she needed to leave the residence immediately and defendant complied.

         In May 2018, J's daughter contacted the police because defendant was at J's residence. Officer Maul received the report of the restraining order violation and went to J's residence. When Maul arrived, defendant was at the door asking for help to go inside. Defendant told Maul that "she had been served the restraining order," but "she felt it didn't apply to her because *** [t]hey had used her married name and * * * she had not legally changed her name to that name." Maul arrested defendant for violating the restraining order.

         The state charged defendant with violating the restraining order based on defendant willfully entering or attempting to enter J's residence. The complaint listed defendant in the caption of the complaint as "Tina Michelle Arnold *** also known as Tina Ball."

         At trial, the parties adduced evidence of the historical facts that we outlined above. In addition, the state presented evidence that defendant got mail at J's "address with Tina Ball on it," that defendant was known by others as Tina Ball, and that, when defendant was served with the restraining order, the attached petition for the restraining order [301 Or.App. 645] described defendant's relationship to J as his "daughter-in-law," and stated that she lived at J's residence. Moreover, the attached petition specifically alleged that "Tina * * * moved into [J's] home and ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.