United States District Court, D. Oregon
OPINION AND ORDER
matter comes before me on Defendant Tracey Coffman's
Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF 18]. Plaintiff Alethea
Baguiao is a current prisoner coming before this court in pro
se. She alleges in her Amended Complaint ("AC")
[ECF 7], under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that in connection with
being denied Short-Term Transitional Leave ("STTL")
from her current term of incarceration, Ms. Coffman (1)
subjected Ms. Baguiao to an unconstitutional ex post
facto law and (2) violated her Fourteenth Amendment
rights by denying her administrative review. AC  at
For the reasons explained below, I GRANT Ms. Coffman's
motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case with
February 28, 2018, Ms. Baguiao pled guilty and was convicted
of two counts of Theft in the First Degree in Lane County
Circuit Court. Washington Decl. [ECF 19] Attach. 1 at 1-2.
She committed the two thefts on or about June 18, 2017, and
July 5, 2017. Id. She was sentenced to 13 months of
imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively,
followed by one year of post-prison supervision. Id.
She began serving her sentence on March 15, 2018. Coffman
Decl. [ECF 20] ¶ 11. This is her current term of
not Ms. Baguiao's first term of incarceration. In fact,
her recent conviction came while she was under post-prison
supervision for a previous offense. Id. For that
previous offense, Ms. Baguiao began serving a term of
incarceration on November 3, 2009. Id. While serving
that term, Ms. Baguiao was released on an Alternative
Incarceration Program ("AIP") non-prison leave on
November 2, 2015. Id. However, after violating the
terms of the AIP, she was returned to prison on January 14,
12, 2017, Oregon Administrative Rule § 291-063-0120
("the Policy") was enacted, which defines the
eligibility requirements for STTL. Id. ¶ 8.
Under the Policy, an inmate is not eligible for STTL if she
has failed a non-prison leave (such as an AIP) or STTL during
her current term of incarceration, or during an immediately
preceding term of incarceration. Or. Admin. R. §
291-063-0120(2)(g). In relation to Ms. Baguiao's current
term of incarceration, the term that began November 3, 2009,
constitutes her "immediately preceding term of
incarceration" under the Policy. Coffman Decl. 
Baguiao alleges that on April 18, 2018, during her current
term of incarceration, she was informed by her intake
counselor that, due to the Policy, she was ineligible for
STTL because of her failed AIP during her immediately
preceding term of incarceration. AC  at 6. She was
informed that if she wanted an administrative review of the
decision finding her ineligible for STTL, she should send an
Inmate Communication Form ("kyte") to the Community
Corrections Division. Id.
April 26, 2018, Ms. Baguiao sent a kyte to Ms. Coffman, who
is the STTL coordinator for the Oregon Department of
Corrections ("ODOC"), requesting administrative
review of the decision denying her STTL. Coffman Decl. 
¶¶ 1, 9. Ms. Coffman responded in a letter dated
May 2, 2018, ("May 2 Letter") which stated:
"This is in response to your request for Administrative
Review of your STTL eligibility. According to Oregon
Administrative Rule, you are ineligible to receive STTL, as
you noted, due to having failed AIP. Exceptions to this rule
are not made." Id. ¶ 9. On May 16, 2018,
Ms. Baguiao sent a kyte to Jeremiah Stromberg requesting
further review of the decision. Id. ¶ 10. The
kyte was forwarded to Ms. Coffman, who replied to Ms. Baguiao
and explained that administrative review had been completed,
referring her to the May 2 Letter. Id. Ms. Baguiao
sent additional requests for further review to various ODOC
personnel, who generally replied that the matter was closed.
See Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J. [ECF 24] at
December 14, 2018, Ms. Baguiao filed the present action.
Compl. [ECF 1]. She filed her Amended Complaint on January 1,
2014, naming only Ms. Coffman as Defendant. AC . Ms.
Coffman moved for summary judgment on August 28, 2019.
Def's Mot. Summ. J. .
judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the moving party demonstrates no issue of material fact
exists, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and
identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial.
Id. at 324. A party cannot defeat a summary judgment
motion by relying on the allegations set forth in the
complaint, unsupported conjecture, or conclusory statements.
Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 343 F.3d 1107,
1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment thus should be entered
against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at
determine whether summary judgment is proper, the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co.,
669 F.2d 1278, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1982).
Coffman moves for summary judgment on four grounds: (1) the
Policy (Or. Admin. R. § 291-063-0120) is not an ex
post facto law; (2) Ms. Coffman did not violate Ms.
Baguiao's Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) Ms. Coffman is
shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified
immunity; and (4) Ms. Baguiao's claims against Ms.
Coffman in her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J.  at 1-2.1 hold (1)
the Policy, as applied to Ms. Baguiao, is not an ex post
facto law, and (2) that Ms. Baguiao's ...