United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division
OPINION & ORDER
AIKEN United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Roy Kaylor seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis
in this action. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), ECF No. 2.
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for TRO is DENIED
and this case is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff
shall have thirty (30) days in which to file an amended
complaint. The Court shall defer ruling on the IFP petition
pending submission of an amended complaint.
Temporary Restraining Order
deciding whether to grant a motion for a temporary
restraining order, courts look to substantially the same
factors that apply to a court's decision on whether to
issue a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l
Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240
F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction
is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded
upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such
relief." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that: (1) the plaintiff is likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) the plaintiff is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
(3) the balance of equities tips in favor of the plaintiff;
and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id.
all parties instituting any civil action in United States
District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity
for meaningful access to federal courts despite their
inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that
access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must
make two determinations. First, a court must determine
whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing
the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must
assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
regard to the second of these determinations, district courts
have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen
complaints even before service of the complaint on the
defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state
a claim. Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison
v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading
standards, the complaint must include a short and plain
statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell All.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard ... asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. The court is not required to
accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as
se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than
pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972). That is, the court should construe
pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the
plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los
Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.
1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice
of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to
amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be
cured by amendment. Id.
alleges that he owns substantial real property in Santa Cruz
County, California. This property has been the subject of
litigation since at least 2010, apparently stemming from the
disputed classification of the property under California law
and Plaintiffs use of the property. Compl. 5. The nature and
details of the dispute are not clear from the Complaint, but
Plaintiff alleges that it has "spawned" forty-two
civil cases over the last nine years and resulted in over
$320, 000 in "legal fees and debt." Id.
Plaintiffs land is scheduled to be sold the County on
December 17, 2019, apparently as a result this litigation.
Id. Plaintiff alleges that the planned sale is in
violation of his constitutional due process rights and will
result in the loss of endangered wildlife habitat through
logging on the property. Id.; TRO Mot. Plaintiff
asks this court to enjoin the scheduled sale of Plaintiffs
property; "[p]erform a full Federal investigation
regarding due process and obvious corruption," in the
Santa Cruz county court; appoint an attorney for Plaintiff;
and award $111, 111, 111.11 in damages. Compl. 6.
asserts that if the property is sold, it will be logged and
developed as housing. TRO Mot. In addition to the loss of
trees, Plaintiff claims that this will result in the loss of
wildlife habitat and potential harm to Native American sacred
sites and natural springs. Plaintiff also alleges that over
100 of his vehicles "consisting primarily of antique
cars, trucks, and prototypes," including the prototype
for the Toyota Prius, have already been removed and
destroyed. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that over 50 of his
bicycles have been removed and that he has been forced
"to give away 4 airplanes to prevent them from getting
destroyed without due process." TRO Mot.
first and most significant problem with the Complaint is that
it fails to adequately state a basis for this Court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Where, as
here, there is no federal statute governing personal
jurisdiction, the law of the state in which the Court sits
applies. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc.,653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011). Oregon's long arm
statute, Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure ("ORCP") 4,
extends personal jurisdiction to the ...