United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division
OPINION & ORDER
MICHAEL McSHANE, United States District Judge.
matter comes before the Court on Defendants Susan E. Aversa
Orrego and Yogurt Hut LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.
ECF No. 13. Summary judgment is premature at this time and so
the Motion is DENIED with leave to refile in ninety (90) days
at the close of limited discovery.
Kevin Kauffman, proceeding pro se, alleges that he applied
for a job at the Yogurt Hut in February 2018 and was told
that he was “too old” to work at the Yogurt Hut.
Susan E. Aversa Orrego is a member of Defendant Yogurt Hut,
LLC (the “LLC”), which owns and operates three
Yogurt Hut locations in Jackson and Josephine Counties.
Aversa Orrego Aff. ECF No. 14. In 2017 and 2018, the LLC had
a maximum of sixteen employees on any working day, most of
whom were part-time and assigned to one of the LLC's
three Yogurt Hut restaurants. Id. “At no time
from 2017 until the present has Yogurt Hut LLC had twenty
(20) employees at the same time.” Id.
second company, Yogurt Hut AV Limited Partnership (the
“Limited Partnership”), owns a fourth Yogurt Hut
location in Medford, Oregon. Aversa Orrego Supp. Aff. ECF No.
19. The LLC is the general partner in the Limited
Partnership, along with six limited partners. Id.
The Limited Partnership has its own employees, payroll, and
employer identification number. Id. The Limited
Partnership files its own tax returns and has its own
worker's compensation coverage, liability insurance
policy, and bank accounts. Id. In 2017 and 2018, the
Limited Partnership employed a maximum of eight employees on
any working day. Id. As with the LLC, most of the
Limited Partnership's employees were part-time and worked
at the Limited Partnership's single restaurant.
Id. Some employees worked for both the LLC and the
Limited Partnership “to accommodate temporary
variations in staffing needs at each of the four
employee who allegedly told Plaintiff he was “too
old” was employed by the LLC to work at the Yogurt Hut
restaurant in Ashland, Oregon, in 2017 and 2018. Aversa
Orrego Supp. Aff.
judgment is appropriate if the record shows that “there
is no genuine dispute as to any materials fact and the
[moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue
determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Servs.,
Inc. v. Pac. Elect Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626,
630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party determines the authenticity of the dispute.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party
shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify
facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at
rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary
judgment motion: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the
existence of genuine issues of material fact should be
resolved against the moving party; and (2) all inferences
drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec.,
809 F.2d at 630-31.
brings a claim for violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
(“ADEA”). Defendants move for summary judgment on
the basis that neither Defendant is an “employer”
within the meaning of the ADEA. Plaintiff seeks to defer
resolution of the present motion until discovery can take