In the Matter of the Compensation of Christina King, Claimant.
SAIF CORPORATION and High Desert Education Service, Respondents. Christina KING, Petitioner,
and Submitted December 20, 2018
Workers' Compensation Board 1605695
D. Yarmo argued the cause for petitioner. Also on the briefs
was Bailey & Yarmo, LLP.
Cupani argued the cause and fled the brief for respondents.
Hadlock, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Aoyagi,
Summary: Claimant seeks judicial review of an order of the
Workers' Compensation Board determining that her foot
injury, which occurred when she slipped on ice in the parking
lot of the school where she was teaching, is not compensable.
Claimant contends that she was still in the course of her
employment at the time of her injury, because, although the
principal had released teachers for the day, the injury
occurred during claimant's regular work hours and she
could have been required to return to the building or help a
student in the parking lot. Held: Because claimant
had been released from and was leaving work at the time of
her injury, under the going and coming rule, the injury did
not occur in the course of claimant's employment.
Or.App. 268] HADLOCK, P. J.
seeks review of an order of the Workers' Compensation
Board determining that her foot injury is not compensable. We
review the board's order for substantial evidence and
errors of law, ORS 656.298(7); ORS 183.482 (8)(a), (c).
Having done so, we conclude that the board did not err.
Accordingly, we affirm.
the High Desert Education Service District (employer or the
HDESD), provides substitute teachers on contract for a number
of school districts in Central Oregon. Claimant is a teacher
and receives substitute teaching assignments from employer.
Claimant accepted an assignment to provide long-term
substitute teaching at an elementary school in Bend while
another teacher was on parental leave.
claimant has not challenged the board's findings of
historical fact, those findings establish the facts for
purposes of judicial review, and our description of the facts
is drawn from those findings. Meltebeke v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 322 Or. 132, 134, 903 P.2d 351
regular shift at the school ended each day at 4:00 p.m. On
the day she was injured, the school's principal had told
teachers that, because of inclement weather, they should plan
to leave school as soon as possible after students were
released at 3:30. Claimant left her classroom shortly after
students were dismissed, before 4:00 p.m. On her way out of
the building, she encountered a student, whom she assisted.
Then, as she walked to her car through the school's
parking lot, she slipped and fell on ice, injuring her ankle.
filed a claim with employer, which denied the claim for the
reason that claimant was not in the course of her employment
at the time of the injury. In affirming an order of an
administrative law judge (ALJ), the board upheld
employer's denial. The ALJ's order, adopted by the
[300 Or.App. 269] board, cited the "going and coming
rule," under which injuries sustained while an employee
is traveling to or from work do not occur in the course of
employment. See SAIF v. Massari, 291 Or.App. 349,
420 P.3d 659 (2018) (describing "going and coming"
rule); see also Krushwitz v. McDonald's
Restaurants, 323 Or. 520, 526-27, 919 P.2d 465 (1996)
(same). The board concluded that, because claimant "had
been released from work for the day and was no longer subject
to the employer's direction and control," the going
and coming rule applied, and claimant's injury did not
occur in the course of her employment.
judicial review, claimant contends that the board erred
because, at the time of the injury, claimant was still in the
course of her employment. Claimant acknowledges that the
parking lot where she slipped on ice is not owned or
controlled by the HDESD, and she does not challenge the
board's determination that the "parking lot"
exception to the "going and coming" rule does not
apply. Nonetheless, claimant contends that the
parking lot was part of her employment premises, and she
testified that, had she encountered a child in the parking
lot in need of assistance, it would have been within her
responsibility as a teacher to assist. Additionally, claimant
notes that she was still technically "on the clock"
and within her shift at the time she left the school at the
principal's direction, and that if she had been required
by the principal to return to the building before her shift
ended at 4:00 p.m., she would have complied. Claimant cites
those facts in support of her contention that her
responsibilities as a teacher continued in the parking lot
and that she therefore was in the course of her employment at
the time of the injury.
Or.App. 270] Claimant also cites our opinion in
Massari, in which we upheld the compensability of an
injury suffered by a physician when he slipped and fell on
ice in a hospital parking lot while on his way to work after
his shift had begun. In claimant's view, this case is
analogous, because claimant's work shift had ...