Submitted August 1, 2019
County Circuit Court 16CR68877; Norman R. Hill, Judge.
G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and
Kali Montague, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public
Defense Services, fled the brief for appellant.
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor
General, and Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General,
fled the brief for respondent.
Hadlock, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Mooney,
appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree theft,
ORS 164.055, and unlawful entry into a motor vehicle, ORS
164.272. Defendant assigns error to the trial court's
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on both
counts. He argues that, because the state's case depended
entirely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, the evidence
did not satisfy the independent evidence rule requirements of
ORS 136.440(1) and was therefore insufficient to support
trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal. Evidence in the record did not satisfy
the independent evidence rule requirements of ORS 136.440(1)
and was therefore insufficient to permit a reasonable
factfinder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant
had committed the crimes with which he was charged.
Or.App. 780] DEHOOG, J.
appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree theft, ORS
164.055, and unlawful entry into a motor vehicle, ORS
164.272. He assigns error to the trial court's denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts. He
argues that, because the state's case depended entirely
on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, the evidence did not
satisfy the requirements of ORS 136.440(1) and was therefore
insufficient to support either conviction. We agree with
defendant that the state's accomplice testimony lacked
the independent corroboration required by ORS 136.440(1),
and, therefore, we reverse.
challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal, we view the evidence "in the
light most favorable to the state to determine whether a
rational trier of fact, making reasonable inferences, could
have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond
a reasonable doubt." State v. Hall, 327 Or.
568, 570, 966 P.2d 208 (1998); see also State v.
Allison, 325 Or. 585, 587-88, 941 P.2d 1017 (1997)
(applying same standard of review to the ruling from a bench
dawn on August 15, 2015, a witness, Schmunk, was awakened by
vehicle lights shining into her home. In response to noises
she heard outside, she looked out of her window to the street
below. Across the street, she saw a man and woman standing
outside her neighbor's work truck; they appeared to be
removing things from it. After yelling out for the pair to
stop what they were doing, Schmunk ran downstairs, leashed
her dog, and ran outside. By that time, however, the pair was
gone. Schmunk saw that the side compartments of the truck
were open and appeared to have been broken into. Schmunk
contacted her neighbor, Decker, who later testified that the
truck and its contents belonged to his employer. Decker
estimated that $2, 000 in tools had been taken from the
trial, Schmunk testified that the man she had seen might have
been in his mid-twenties or thirties, appeared to be
"white," had an average build, and had
"shorter, not shaved, *** typical guy's hair."
She also [299 Or.App. 781] testified that the male
"appeared to be carrying a toolbox and his arms were
kind of like this (gesture) and he was kind of waddling, so
you could see kind of the muscles on the arms." Law
enforcement arrived and dusted the truck for fingerprints.
One of the prints was found to be a match for defendant's
alleged accomplice, Prisco, who later admitted to law
enforcement that she had been the woman that ...