Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Llanes v. Zalewski

United States District Court, D. Oregon

October 4, 2019

JESUSA LLANES, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREA ZALEWSKI, SILVER RIDGE ADULT FOSTER CARE HOME, LLC, Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          STACIE F. BECKERMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Jesusa Llanes (“Llanes”) filed this case against Defendants Andrea Zalewski (“Zalewski”) and Silver Ridge Adult Foster Care Home, LLC (“Silver Ridge”) (together, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated the minimum and overtime wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216. (ECF No. 1.) In response, Defendants asserted state law counterclaims for quantum meruit, conversion, and unjust enrichment. (ECF No. 21.) Llanes filed an answer to Defendants' counterclaims, asserting her own state law counterclaims for wrongful divestment of possession contrary to legal estate interest, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 43.)

         Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 46, 50.) Defendants have also moved to dismiss Llanes' counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 55.) The Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and all parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment, denies Llanes' motion for summary judgment, and denies as moot Defendants' motion to dismiss.

         BACKGROUND[1]

         Silver Ridge is a Class Two adult foster care home that provides room and board to its five residents. (Declaration of Andrea Zalewski, Apr. 30, 2019 (“Zalewski Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-4.) The residents are all over sixty-five years old and have medical or psychological conditions, including schizophrenia, insomnia, mood disorders, and depression. (Declaration of Jesusa Llanes, Apr. 30, 2019 (“Llanes Decl.”) ¶ 8.) Oregon law does not require a Class Two facility to employ medical professionals. (Zalewski Decl. ¶ 4.)

         In 2014, Defendants hired Llanes as a resident care manager. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 6.) In that role, Llanes cared for Silver Ridge's residents on a twenty-four hour basis. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 7.) For example, Llanes prepared and served meals, tracked and administered medication, maintained medication administration records, coordinated care with outside providers, monitored and enforced house policies, and performed housework. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 7.) Llanes did not diagnose the residents or prescribe medicine. (Declaration of Katherine Acosta, Apr. 30, 2019 (“Acosta Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (Llanes Dep. 58:5-13, Feb. 20, 2019 (“Llanes Dep.”)).)

         Llanes also helped the residents with grooming and general hygiene, maintained peace between the residents, assisted the residents with cash or account management, and provided first-aid care. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 7.) On a weekly basis, Llanes purchased groceries and medication, received and distributed mail and food deliveries to the residents, and received and processed goods that Defendants ordered online. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 7.) Llanes purchased food and medication from local stores and pharmacies, and did not order goods online. (Llanes Dep. 47:19-48:6; 49:11-14; 69:5-70:6; 70:21-71:5.)

         Pursuant to an employment agreement, Llanes received a $3, 000 monthly salary, as well as room and board. (Acosta Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 3.) Throughout her tenure at Silver Ridge, Llanes worked seventy-five hours per week. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 11.) She did not receive overtime pay. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 11.)

         In March 2017, Llanes informed Zalewski that she was engaged, and asked if her fiancé could live with her at Silver Ridge. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 13.) Zalewski said yes. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 13.) Seven months later, Zalewski terminated Llanes' employment. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendants changed the locks and left Llanes' belongings in the driveway. (Llanes Decl. ¶ 14.)

         DISCUSSION

         I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, or determine the truth of matters in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

         II. ANALYSIS

         A. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.