and submitted February 5, 2018
Psychiatric Security Review Board 991597
S. Matarazzo argued the cause and fled the reply brief for
petitioner. On the opening brief was Susan D. Isaacs.
L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for
respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Hadlock, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Aoyagi,
Or.App. 276] PER CURIAM.
appeals, requesting that we reverse and remand an order of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) denying his 2015
request for discharge from PSRB jurisdiction and continuing
his commitment to the Oregon State Hospital. We recently
reversed and remanded a PSRB order denying petitioner's
2017 request for discharge. Rinne v. PSRB, 297
Or.App. 549, 443 P.3d 731 (2019) (Rinne II). As he
did in Rinne II, petitioner argues that PSRB's
determination that he remains subject to PSRB jurisdiction is
not supported by substantial evidence. For largely the same
reasons we expressed in Rinne II, we agree with
petitioner. As a result, we reverse and remand PSRB's
order asserting continuing jurisdiction over petitioner.
the two orders are based on similar records,  PSRB's 2015
order is not identical to its 2017 order. We conclude,
however, that the differences are not material and thus do
not cure the deficiencies that we identified in Rinne
II. For example, the 2015 order finds additional
qualifying diagnoses and risks of danger beyond those
identified in the 2017 order, but-like the 2017 order-the
2015 order fails to demonstrate a relationship between
petitioner's diagnoses and his risk of dangerousness.
More specifically, as in Rinne II, there is no
evidence that any of petitioner's qualifying diagnoses
cause him to be a substantial danger to others, and
PSRB's findings of fact here do not even purport to find
that nexus. Nevertheless, PSRB concluded that
petitioner's qualifying mental disease or defect
"renders him" a substantial danger to others.
noted in Rinne II, it is evident that PSRB equates
its determination that petitioner's qualifying disorder
"renders" him dangerous with a determination that
the two are causally related. But there are no findings from
[299 Or.App. 277] which the conclusion that such a nexus
exists could logically follow. Moreover, even if PSRB's
findings could support that conclusion, the 2015
order, like the order we considered in Rinne II,
fails to adequately explain PSRB's reasoning; that is, it
does not explain how the facts of petitioner's diagnoses
and dangerousness could lead to a conclusion that there
exists a causal nexus between the two. In its briefing on
appeal, PSRB attempts to supply that reasoning, but, as we
did in Rinne II, we reject such an attempt.
"[I]t is PSRB's obligation to provide its reasoning
in its order; we will not speculate as to what PSRB's
reasoning might have been, nor can we rely on reasoning PSRB
might belatedly provide in its briefing on appeal." 297
Or.App. at 563. Thus, we conclude that PSRB's 2015 order
is not supported by substantial evidence or reason and,
accordingly, reverse and remand. See ORS
183.482(8)(c) ("The court shall set aside or remand the
order if the court finds that the order is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.").
 The record before PSRB in Rinne
II included the record from this case, as well as
post-2015 materials. Different testimony was presented at
each hearing, but, based on our review, the 2015 testimony
did not differ ...