United States District Court, D. Oregon
MICHAEL H. SIMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Escalante Golf, Inc., and Escalante Pumpkin Ridge, LLC, move
pursuant to Rules 12(f) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to strike or dismiss certain claims from
Plaintiff Tara Grissom's First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). For the reasons that follow, the Court
grants Defendants' motion.
alleges that she was hired to work as a bartender and server
at the Pumpkin Ridge Golf Club in April 2017 and that she
worked there until October 7, 2017. Plaintiff asserts that
she slipped and fell in the workplace and suffered on-the-job
injuries on or about May 14, 2017. Plaintiff filed a
workers' compensation claim in connection with those
injuries on May 15, 2017. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants
retaliated against her for seeking medical treatment by
yelling at her, falsely accusing her of stealing money, and
reducing her work schedule, among other allegations.
Plaintiff brings this action for damages, alleging violations
of several Oregon statutes.
may strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).
The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid spending time
and money litigating spurious issues. Whittlestone, Inc.
v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010);
see also Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524,
1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,
510 U.S. 517 (1994). The disposition of a motion to strike is
within the discretion of the district court. See Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Gemini Mgmt., 921 F.2d
241, 244 (9th Cir. 1990). “Motions to strike are
disfavored and infrequently granted.” Legal Aid
Servs. of Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 561 F.Supp.2d
1187, 1189 (D. Or. 2008); see also Capella Photonics,
Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 77 F.Supp.3d 850, 858 (N.D.
Cal. 2014) (“Motions to strike are regarded with
disfavor because of the limited importance of pleadings in
federal practice and because they are often used solely to
delay proceedings.” (quotation marks and alterations
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted
only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the
claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual
allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief.
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622
F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the
court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts
alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v.
Hewlett- Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th
Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ.
Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be
entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a
complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a
cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the
opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr
v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The court
must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual
allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v.
Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir.
2008). The court need not, however, credit the
plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual
allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
argue that all counts in Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint that are duplicative of and redundant with
Plaintiff's First, Fifth, and Seventh Claims for Relief
should be stricken or dismissed. The Court addresses each
purportedly duplicative claim in turn.
Second Claim is titled, “Workers' Compensation
Retaliation - Hostile Working Environment.” That claim
states in its entirety: “Plaintiff realleges paragraphs
1 through 15 and 17 through 20. By their conduct Defendants
subjected Plaintiff to a hostile working environment in
substantial part because she invoked Oregon's
worker's compensation system.” ECF 7. Defendants
argue that this Claim incorporates the identical allegations
from Plaintiff's First Claim, titled, “Workers'
Compensation Retaliation - Terms and Conditions of
Employment.” Defendants argue that because there is no
difference between the factual allegations supporting either
claim, and because each claim is brought under the same
statute (Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.040), Claim two is
redundant and should be stricken.
cites no authority for the proposition that a hostile working
environment is a distinct cause of action from
“retaliation - terms and conditions of
employment” when the two claims are brought under the
same statute with identical factual allegations. In fact,
Plaintiff acknowledges that “in essence, in her Second
Claim for Relief, Plaintiff alleges that the cumulative
effect of Defendant's multiple acts of retaliation which
she realleges from paragraph 15(a)-(p) of her First Claim for
Relief created an actionable hostile working environment for
her.” ECF 24. Claim Two is redundant with Claim One.
The Court, therefore, grants Defendants' motion to strike
Claims Three, Four, and Nine
argue that Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief
(Retaliation for Opposing Unlawful Employment Practices -
Count One) and Fourth Claim for Relief (Retaliation for
Opposing Unlawful Employment Practices - Count One) rely on
the identical allegations underlying Plaintiff's First
and Fifth Claims for Relief, adding only that Defendants
violated O.R.S. § 659A.030(1)(f) in doing so.
Plaintiff's Claim Nine is also brought under O.R.S.
§ 659A.030(1)(f), and labels substantially the same
factual allegations as “Constructive Discharge in
Retaliation for Opposing Unlawful Employment Practice.”
Defendants further argue that because Plaintiff has asserted
a violation of ...