In the Matter of S. S., a Child.
K. L., Appellant. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, In the Matter of S. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,
K. L., Appellant.
and submitted March 27, 2019
Deschutes County Circuit Court 18JU04838, 18JU04837 Raymond
D. Crutchley, Judge.
Valerie Colas, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for
appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey, Chief
Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Offce of Public Defense
M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for
respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Linder,
Or.App. 372] Reversed.
Or.App. 373] PER CURIAM
appeals judgments finding her two children to be within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, arguing that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) to adjudicate the dependency petitions
because Oregon was not the children's "home
state." The Department of Human Services (DHS) concedes
that Oregon was not the children's home state but argues
that we should affirm because the court's findings and
the record support temporary emergency jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. Because nothing in the record suggests that the trial
court ordered temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS
109.751(1), we reverse the jurisdictional
state concedes, and we agree, that Oregon was not the
children's home state, and, therefore, the juvenile court
did not have jurisdiction under ORS 109.741(1).
Alternatively, the state argues that the juvenile court had
subject matter jurisdiction under ORS 109.751(1), which
grants states "temporary emergency jurisdiction if the
child is present in this state and the child has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child,
is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or
abuse." The state contends that, even though the
juvenile court did not enter an order taking temporary
emergency jurisdiction, the court's findings, as
supported by the record, establish that mother endangered the
children due to physically abusive and erratic behavior,
which is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of ORS
109.751(1). However, we have reversed a jurisdictional
judgment under similar circumstances where the [298 Or.App.
374] record, like the record here, indicated that the court
did not take temporary emergency jurisdiction over the child.
Dept. of Human Services v. T. K, 292 Or.App. 356,
360-61, 360 n 4, 425 P.3d 480 (2018) (declining to address
the possibility of temporary emergency jurisdiction as an
alternative basis for affirmance). The state has not
persuasively distinguished this case from T. F.
Accordingly, we reverse the jurisdictional judgments.
 The UCCJEA applies to dependency
proceedings in Oregon, ORS 4I9B.8O3(2), and is codified at
ORS 109.701 to 109.834. ORS 109.701 ("ORS 109.701 to
109.834 may be cited as the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.").
 Before oral argument, the juvenile
court entered a judgment terminating wardship and dismissing
jurisdiction. The parties stipulate that the issue is not
moot because the jurisdictional judgments continue to have
collateral consequences on mother. We agree. See Dept. of
Human Services v. A. B.,362 Or. 412, 426, 412 P.3d 1169
(2018) (concluding that appeal is not moot unless DHS
persuades the appellate court that the ...