United States District Court, D. Oregon
JUAN R. LIMAS, Petitioner,
GARRETT LANEY, Respondent.
R. Limas Pro Se
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General Kristen E. Boyd, Assistant
Attorney General Attorneys for Respondent
OPINION AND ORDER
A. HERNANDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
brings this habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 challenging the legality of his state-court convictions
from Marion County dated October 17, 2013. For the reasons
that follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2) is
October 4, 2013, Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of
Recklessly Endangering Another Person, one count of Attempted
murder with a Firearm, and one count of Unlawful Use of a
Weapon. Respondent's Exhibit 103, p. 1. He also entered a
no-contest plea to one count of Delivery of Marijuana for
Consideration. Respondent's Exhibit 104, pp. 5-6.
Petitioner and the State stipulated to a 130-month prison
sentence, and the Marion County Circuit Court imposed the
agreed-upon sentence. Respondent's Exhibits 104 &
did not take a direct appeal and, instead, filed for
post-conviction relief ("PCR") in Umatilla County
where the PCR court denied relief on his claims. The Oregon
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as meritless and
therefore not appealable pursuant to ORS 138.525(3), and the
Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Respondent's Exhibits
120 & 122.
filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus case on May
23, 2018. A liberal reading of the pro se Petition
suggests that Petitioner seeks to raise three claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he claims that
trial counsel was ineffective when he: (1) failed to object
to Petitioner's sentence as violative of Oregon's
200% rule; (2) allowed Petitioner's plea to "rest in
a significant degree on promises of the prosecutor, so that
it could be said to be part of the inducement and such
promises went unfulfilled;" and (3) failed to ensure
that Petitioner's plea and stipulation to facts were
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
asks the Court to deny relief on these claims because: (1)
they are not properly pled; (2) Grounds One and Two are
procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner is unable to excuse
the default; and (3) the PCR court's decision as to the
voluntariness of Petitioner's plea (Ground Three) is
correct and entitled to deference under the Anti-terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act. Although Petitioner's
supporting memorandum was due on April 30, he has not filed
his brief nor has he communicated with the Court since paying
the filing fee for this case on June 1, 2018.
the Court liberally construes the pro se Petition to
state the claims identified above, it declines to dismiss the
Petition for failure to meet proper pleading standards and,
instead, proceeds directly to the exhaustion analysis.
Exhaustion and Procedural Default
habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims by
fairly-presenting them to the state's highest court,
either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings,
before a federal court will consider the merits of those
claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982).
"As a general rule, a petitioner satisfies the
exhaustion requirement by fairly presenting the federal claim
to the appropriate state courts ... in the manner required by
the state courts, thereby 'affording the state courts a
meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal
error.'" Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896,
915-916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 257, (1986)).
habeas litigant failed to present his claims to the state
courts in a procedural context in which the merits of the
claims were actually considered, the claims have not been
fairly presented to the state courts and are therefore not
eligible for federal habeas corpus review. Edwards v.
Carpenter,529 U.S. 44 6, 453 (2000); Castille v.
Peoples,489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). In this respect, a
petitioner is deemed to have "procedurally
defaulted" his claim if he failed to comply with a state
procedural rule, or ...