United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
William Narus Natalie K. Wight U.S. Attorney's Office
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Paul Schaefer Pro se Defendant
Ludwig Ludwig Runstein LLC Tiffany A. Harris Tiffany A.
Harris, Attorney at Law Stand-by Attorneys for Defendant
OPINION & ORDER
A. HERNÁNDEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jason Paul Schaefer is charged with two counts of assault on
a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) and
(b); one count of carrying and using a destructive device
during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii); one count of using an
explosive to commit a federal felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 844(h)(1); one count of carrying an explosive
during the commission of a federal felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 844(h)(2); one count of unlawful transport of
explosive materials in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
842(a)(3)(A) and 844(a); one count of possession of an
unregistered destruction device in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5841, 586l(d), 5871; and one count of felon in
possession of explosives in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 842(i)(1) and 844(a).
Schaefer, proceeding pro se, filed fifteen pretrial motions
in this case between April 5, 2019 and April 11, 2019. Five
of those motions were either denied or withdrawn at oral
argument on April 24, 2019. The remaining motions include:
(1) Motion to dismiss for speedy trial act violations ;
(2) Motion to dismiss for Brady violations ;
(3) Motion to dismiss for outrageous government misconduct
(4) Four motions to suppress evidence ;
(5) Motion for a Franks hearing ; and
(6) Two motions to compel discovery .
Defendant's motion to suppress statements, filed October
27, 2018, remains pending at this time.
reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to compel
discovery  is denied in part and granted in part. The
Court denies all other motions.
Schaefer made a series of online purchases from eBay between
March and September of 2017. On September 21, 2017, FBI
agents in Portland learned of these purchases. Included among
these purchases were a number of chemicals that agents
determined could be used to make explosives.
October 10, 2017, agents obtained a search warrant for Mr.
Schaefer's apartment. In the request for this warrant,
agents relied in part on information provided by eBay. This
information was originally volunteered and subsequently
produced in response to a grand jury subpoena. Agents also
relied on information from a previous encounter with Mr.
Schaefer in April 2017. In that encounter, police responded
to a hazardous material call and found mercury inside Mr.
Mr. Schaefer's probation officer learned a search warrant
had been issued, she called Mr. Schaefer and ordered him to
appear in her office the following morning. When he appeared
the morning of October 11, 2017, law enforcement
officers-from the FBI, Washington County Sheriff's
Office, Portland Police Bureau, Oregon State Police, and
other agencies-executed the warrant at his vacant apartment.
After Mr. Schaefer left the probation office, officers,
working in coordination with those executing the warrant,
attempted to follow him. After they lost contact, Mr.
Schaefer's probation officer told officers she would
issue a detainer on defendant for violating the terms of his
Schaefer eventually returned to his apartment complex. When
officers recognized his car, they attempted to stop him.
Despite being told he was under arrest, he drove away. After
a short pursuit, Mr. Schaefer's car came to a stop in
traffic. Two officers used their cars to box him in, drew
their guns, and ordered him out of the car. Instead of
complying with these commands, Mr. Schaefer stated something
to the effect of “we're all going to die” and
ignited a cigarette package he was holding. The cigarette
package detonated, and Mr. Schaefer's left hand was
Schaefer was arrested and transported to a hospital for
medical treatment. Meanwhile, Mr. Schaefer's car and its
contents-including a second cigarette package-were searched
without a warrant. The cigarette package allegedly contained
TATP, an explosive material. Additional evidence, which
included e-matches, chemicals, black powder, and what
appeared to be a remoted firing system, was discovered in Mr.
Schaefer's apartment pursuant to the original warrant.
Officers also seized electronic storage devices, and a
business card for a storage facility, with a unit listed on
back. Officers immediately opened and secured the storage
unit without a warrant. They did not observe any obvious
threats to public safety but did observe a container that
looked like a cooler. After later obtaining and executing a
warrant for the storage unit, officers found additional
Schaefer was indicted by grand juries in both Washington
County and the federal District of Oregon.
Motion to Suppress Statements
October 27, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
statements he made to law enforcement and to his
parents. He argues these statements were obtained
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
(1966) and were involuntary under the Due Process Clause. He
argues, in part, that he was in immense pain and distress,
and was under the influence of Ibogaine and powerful pain
November 20, 2018, the Court held oral argument on the
motion. As stated on the record, and in the Opinion &
Order issued January 17, 2019 (hereinafter
“O&O”), the Court reserved ruling on the
issue and stated that “to the extent the parties wish
to present evidence on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Statements , the Court will hear this evidence, and any
further argument, at the pretrial conference.”
April 29, 2019, the Court again heard argument on the motion.
The government did not present any additional evidence, but
rather clarified which statements it proposed introducing at
trial. These included:
(1) Statements captured by body camera footage from the April
(2) Defendant's statements to an officer in the parking
lot of Defendant's apartment complex, prior to the
detonation of an explosive;
(3) Defendant's alleged threats immediately preceding the
detonation of an explosive;
(4) Statements captured on a video of Defendant, taken
immediately after the detonation of an explosive; and
(5) Jail calls between Defendant and his father.
initial matter, the Court granted Defendant's motion in
limine to exclude all evidence related to the April 2017
incident. This includes the body-cam footage that recorded
Defendant's statements. Defendant has also indicated that
he does not object to the introduction of the video that
captured statements he made immediately following the
detonation of an explosive.
the remaining statements, the Court finds Defendant's
arguments, relying on alleged Miranda and Due
Process Clause violations, without merit. Under
Miranda “the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a
suspect during ‘custodial interrogation' without a
prior warning.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S.
292, 296 (1990). A custodial interrogation is
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444). Involuntary confessions are also inadmissible under
the Due Process Clause. Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157 (1986); Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 979
(9th Cir. 2011). However, “coercive police activity is
a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
‘voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause[.]” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
Defendant's statements were not the product of custodial
interrogations. Defendant was not in custody when he made
statements before the explosion. Defendant's statements
to his father were just that-a recorded conversation between
a father and son-and not the product of a police
interrogation. While Defendant may argue he was heavily
medicated and in extreme pain and distress following a
traumatic injury and surgery, the Court found, after
listening to the recordings, that Defendant was clear and
coherent. As stated on the record, any medicine he may have
been taking did not impact his ability to communicate or
understand the context of his conversations. Moreover,
Defendant has failed to identify any coercive police activity
to support a finding that his statements were not voluntary
under the Due Process Clause.
motion to suppress statements is therefore denied.
Motion to Dismiss for Violations of the Speedy
moves to dismiss the case for Speedy Trial Act violations.
Defendant first states that “the government took 40
days to transport [him] to [the] competency evaluation, and
about 15 days to transport [him] back to Portland[.]”
Def. Mot. to Dismiss/Speedy Trial, ECF 146. In his reply,
Defendant argues that (1) the Court abused its discretion and
pressured Defendant to waive his speedy trial rights on
January 30, 2018 and June 18, 2018; (2) the government moved
for the competency evaluation in bad faith; (3) the
government has filed three superseding indictments based on
the same evidence; (4) the time between September 24, 2018
and March 23, 2019 was improperly excluded without
Defendant's consent; and (5) the Court failed to rule on
the first round of pretrial motions within thirty days.
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, a
defendant must be brought to trial “within seventy days
from the filing date . . . of the information or indictment,
or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial
officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. §
3161(c)(1); United States v. Medina, 524 F.3d 974,
978 (9th Cir. 2008). However, those seventy days are tolled
pursuant to certain “automatic” exclusions
outlined in the Act. Medina, 524 F.3d at 978. For
example, under § 3161(h)(1)(F), a court must exclude
“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the
filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing
on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.”
§ 3161(h)(1)(F); Medina, 524 F.3d at
978. A court must also exclude “delay
reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty
days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is
actually under advisement by the court.” §
purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, there are two types of
pretrial motions: those that require a hearing, and those
that do not. Medina, 524 F.3d at 978. Generally, if
a pretrial motion
requires a hearing, a district court must exclude the
following periods of delay: (i) the period from the date the
motion was filed to the conclusion of the hearing; (ii) the
period from the conclusion of the hearing until the date the
district court “receives all the submissions by counsel
it needs to decide that motion; and (iii) the period from the
last day of the period described in (i) or (ii), as
applicable, until the court rules on the motion, but no more
than 30 days, In general, the district court must exclude
these periods of delay whether or not the delay was
reasonably necessary. Moreover, the district court must
exclude time while the motion is pending even if the court
ultimately does not hold a hearing or rule on the motion.
Id. at 979 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Court first addresses Defendant's argument regarding the
government's delay in transporting him to the competency
evaluation. Defendant is correct that transportation delays
of more than ten days, calculated from the date of the order
directing transportation to the arrival at the destination,
are presumptively unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)(F). However, this time is properly and
automatically excluded for another reason: the motion to
suppress Defendant's statements, filed October 27, 2018,
is resolved by this Opinion.
motion to suppress statements falls within the type of
motions that normally requires an evidentiary hearing.
Medina, 524 F.3d at 983. Here, the Court heard oral
argument on the motion on November 20, 2018. Based on the
record at the time, the Court determined that further
evidence was necessary before a ruling could be issued.
See O&O 13, ECF 121. The parties agreed to
revisit the issue and present evidence at the pretrial
conference. Thus, the ...