Submitted October 18, 2018
County Circuit Court 15CR40469; Gary Lee Williams, Judge.
G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and
Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public
Defense Services, fled the brief for appellant.
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor
General, and Matthew Maile, Assistant Attorney General, fled
the brief for respondent.
Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Garrett,
Judge pro tempore.
Summary: Defendant appeals a supplemental judgment awarding
restitution, assigning error to the trial court's
imposition of restitution 331 days after the entry of the
judgment of conviction. Defendant argues that the trial
court's imposition of restitution more than 90 days after
entry of the judgment violated ORS 137.106(1)(a) because the
delay was not justified by good cause. Held: The
trial court did not err in imposing restitution 331 days
after the entry of the judgment of conviction. ORS
137.106(1)(a) requires only that the state present certain
evidence to the court within 90 days; it imposes no time
limit for the court to act on that evidence.
Or.App. 399] GARRETT, J. PRO TEMPORE.
137.106(1)(a) provides that, if the state seeks restitution
in a criminal case, the prosecutor must present the trial
court with supporting evidence "at the time of
sentencing or within 90 days after entry of the
judgment." The court may extend that period upon a
showing of good cause. In this case, the trial court imposed
restitution in a supplemental judgment entered 331 days after
the entry of the judgment of conviction. On appeal, defendant
argues that the delay in entering the supplemental judgment
for restitution was not justified by good cause. However, the
current text of ORS 137.106(1) does not require a
supplemental judgment imposing restitution to be entered
within any particular time after the judgment of conviction.
Therefore, we affirm.
relevant facts are procedural and not in dispute. After
entering a plea of no contest to several charges, defendant
was sentenced on February 24, 2016, and the judgment of
conviction was entered on that date. Before the sentencing
hearing, the state filed a "restitution worksheet"
requesting restitution under ORS 137.106, and defendant filed
a motion requesting a restitution hearing. At sentencing,
defendant's attorney asked the court to set a separate
restitution hearing because he needed "some time to
digest it further." The court agreed with the
attorney's request. As a result of a series of events not
relevant to our review, a restitution hearing was held on
January 12, 2017, and a supplemental judgment ordering
defendant to pay $6, 450.89 in restitution was entered on
January 20, 2017-331 days after the original judgment was
appeal, defendant's sole challenge to the restitution
award is that the trial court violated ORS 137.106 because
"good cause" did not justify entering the
supplemental judgment 331 days after the entry of the
judgment of conviction. The state contends that the trial
court correctly found good cause for the delay. We review for
legal error. State v. Biscotti, 219 Or.App. 296,
299, 182 P.3d 269 (2008).
137.106(1)(a) provides, in part:
"When a person is convicted of a crime, or a violation
as described in ORS 153.008, that has resulted in economic
damages, the district attorney shall investigate and [297
Or.App. 400] present to the court, at the time of sentencing
or within 90 days after entry of the judgment, evidence of
the nature and amount of the damages. The court may extend
the time by which the presentation must be made for good
plain text of the statute provides that the state is
obligated to "present" restitution evidence to the
court within 90 days of the entry of judgment. The court may
extend the time for that presentation on a showing of good
defendant did not articulate any argument that the state had
failed to "present to the court *** evidence of the
nature and amount of the damages" within 90 days after
entry of the judgment. ORS l37.lO6(1)(a). Rather, he argued
that that statutory text required the court itself
to determine the amount of restitution and enter judgment