Submitted March 23, 2018
Washington County Circuit Court C152222CR James Lee Fun, Jr.,
G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and
Vanessa Areli, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public
Defense Services, fled the opening brief for appellant.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section,
and Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of
Public Defense Services, fled the reply brief for appellant.
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor
General, and Susan Yorke, Assistant Attorney General, fled
the brief for respondent.
Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Shorr,
appeals a judgment of conviction for the unauthorized use of
a vehicle (UUV). Defendant assigns error to the trial
court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on
the UUV charge, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to
show that defendant knew that the vehicle was stolen.
Held: A rational factfinder could have found that
the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
knew the vehicle was stolen, and, therefore, the trial court
did not err when it denied defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal.
Or.App.830] TOOKEY, J.
subject of this case is a vintage 1985 Suzuki moped.
Defendant appeals a conviction for the unauthorized use of
that vehicle (UUV). ORS 164.135. On appeal, defendant assigns
error to the trial court's denial of his motion for
judgment of acquittal on that charge, arguing that
"[t]he evidence is insufficient to show that defendant
knew that the moped was stolen." We conclude that a rational
factfinder could have found that the state proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant knew this moped was stolen,
and, therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.
Accordingly, we affirm.
reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal,
we review the facts in the light most favorable to the state
and draw all reasonable inferences in the state's favor
to determine "whether any rational trier of fact,
accepting reasonable inferences and credibility choices,
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." State v. Lupoli, 348 Or.
346, 366, 234 P.3d 117 (2010). Additionally, "when, as
here, a defendant makes the [motion for judgment of
acquittal] at the close of the state's case, 'the
appellate court must consider all the evidence and if it is
sufficient to sustain the conviction.'" State v.
Bilsborrow, 230 Or.App. 413, 418-19, 215 P.3d 914');">215 P.3d 914 [296
Or.App.831] (2009) (quoting State v. Gardner, 231
Or. 193, 195, 372 P.2d 783 (1962)). We present the facts
consistently with that standard.
relevant to this appeal, defendant was charged with UUV. The
state alleged that defendant "unlawfully and knowingly
took, operated, rode in, exercised control over, or otherwise
used a motor vehicle, without the permission of the
trial, the state called the victim and Deputy Mintier as
witnesses on behalf of the state. The victim was the owner of
a "vintage" 1985 Suzuki moped that ran
"perfectly." When the victim purchased the moped,
the victim received service records and multiple bills of
sale that documented the previous owners of the moped. In
that condition, the moped was worth approximately $950
because the moped was titled and street legal. On May 28,
2015, the victim left the state to attend his
grandmother's funeral in California. When the victim
returned home on June 2, the victim discovered that his moped
was missing from his parking spot. The victim immediately
reported the moped as stolen because the victim had not given
anyone permission to use his moped.
7, Mintier stopped defendant for speeding on a moped. As part
of the routine procedure for conducting a traffic stop,
Mintier ran the license plate and learned that the license
plate came back to the victim's stolen moped. Eventually,
Mintier was able to determine that the moped that defendant
was riding did not match the make and model of the moped
registered to the license plate and that the moped that
defendant was riding had not been reported as stolen.
Although the moped that defendant was riding had not been
reported as stolen, defendant admitted to Mintier that he had
switched the license plate that was on the moped that he was
riding with the license plate from a moped that was at
defendant and Mintier arrived at defendant's home,
Mintier found the victim's moped with the license plate
removed. Defendant told Mintier that he bought the
victim's moped off of Craigslist "about a week prior
and had no way of contacting the seller." Defendant also
stated that [296 Or.App.832] he did not have any emails, text
messages, or phone call records that would help identify the
seller, and that he could not provide the full name of the
seller. Defendant produced a "highly suspicious"
bill of sale that Mintier said would "set off some alarm
bells" if he were purchasing a vehicle. A bill of sale
generally has "[t]he full name of the seller, the date
of the sale, the agreed price, * * * a statement releasing
ownership of the vehicle to the new owner," a "full
description of the vehicle, including the VIN number, any
license plate information or title information, and contact
information * * * for the previous owner and the new
owner." Defendant's bill of sale was handwritten on
the back of a used 3" x 5" index card, identified
the seller only as "Jerry W.," listed an address
that did not belong to any structure, did not identify the
model of the moped, did not identify the moped's VIN or
license plate number, and did not identify the buyer or
contain defendant's name or his signature. Additionally, the
bill of sale listed the sale price as ...