United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
SAMUEL W. WANI, Plaintiff,
GEORGE FOX UNIVERSITY; GREGG BOUGHTON; and CHRIS Y, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Yim You United States Magistrate Judge.
Samuel Wani (“Wani”), proceeding pro se,
alleges various claims stemming from a hand injury he
sustained during football practice at George Fox University
(“GFU”) in August 2015. In his original
Complaint, Wani alleged claims against Dominick Fix-Gonzalez
(“Fix-Gonzalez”), Dr. Thomas Croy (“Dr.
Croy”), Providence Medical Group
(“Providence”), GFU, and nine GFU employees,
including Head Football Athletic Trainer, Gregg Boughton
(“Boughton”), and Head Coach, Chis Casey
(“Casey”), for: (1) “Cyberbullying, racial
verbal harassment” (First Claim); (2) two claims of
negligence, titled as claims for “Discrimination,
medical false claim, fraud, negligence, and intentional
infliction of physical/emotional pain and suffering”
(Second Claim) and “Medical fraud, negligence and
refusal of treatment” (Third Claim); (3) “Racial
discrimination and hatred” (Fourth Claim); (4)
“Wrongful Disclosure of Individually Identifiable
Health Information (HIPAA Violations)” (Fifth Claim);
and (5) breach of contract (Sixth Claim). Compl. 9-11, ECF
#1. He sought damages totaling over $70 million. Id.
September 28, 2017, Wani voluntarily dismissed all claims
against Providence. ECF #53. On April 5, 2018, this court
granted GFU defendants' Rule 12 motion, and dismissed
plaintiff's first, second, third, and sixth claims
without prejudice, and plaintiff's fifth claim with
prejudice. ECF #146. On November 15, 2018, on motion for
summary judgment, this court dismissed all claims against
defendants Fix-Gonzalez and Dr. Croy. ECF #209. This court
also dismissed all claims against the individual GFU
defendants, except that the court granted Wani's motion
to file an amended complaint limited to personal injury
claims against Boughton, Casey, and GFU. Id. Wani
filed his amended complaint on December 3, 2018, and
defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment on
December 28, 2018. ECF #213. The court finds that this matter
is suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to LR
7-1(d)(1), and the motion for summary judgment is granted for
the reasons discussed below.
FRCP 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The party moving for summary judgment
bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a
triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party
does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the
pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”
Id. at 324 (citing FRCP 56(e)).
determining what facts are material, the court considers the
underlying substantive law regarding the claims. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Otherwise
stated, only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Id. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if
there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. A
“scintilla of evidence” or “evidence that
is merely colorable or not significantly probative” is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2000). The court “does not weigh the evidence or
determine the truth of the matter, but only determines
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint
v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.
1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the existence of
material factual issue are resolved against the moving
parties and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.” Addisu, 198 F.3d at
1134 (citation omitted).
only remaining claims are negligence claims, which are
governed by Oregon law. This court has supplemental
jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). However, the court has discretion to keep the
case, or decline to keep it, if the court has
“dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,
114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.), supplemented, 121 F.3d 714
(9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Oct. 1, 1997).
1367(c)(3) derives from [the Supreme Court's] admonition
that ‘[n]eedless decisions of state law should be
avoided.'” Trustees of Constr. Indus. &
Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert Valley Landscape
& Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966)); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the
usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of the factors to be considered
under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.”). In exercising its discretion, the district
court must “explain how declining jurisdiction serves
the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to the
parties, and comity.” Trustees of Constr.
Indus., 333 F.3d at 925.
exercising discretion and deciding whether to decline, or to
retain, supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when
any factor in subdivision (c) is implicated is a
responsibility that district courts are duty-bound to take
seriously.” Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001.
“Given the importance of these values in our federal
system, the proper administration of justice is far better
served by a deliberative decision than by default.”
parties have not asked the court to remand this case to state
court, and this court is not obligated to consider the issue
where it has not been raised by the parties. Id.
(“[W]hile a district court must be sure that it has
federal jurisdiction under § 1367(a), once it is
satisfied that the power to resolve state law claims exists,
the court is not required to make a § 1367(c) analysis
unless asked to do so by a party.”). However, in this
case, discovery has been completed and a number of
dispositive motions have been decided. Given how far this
case has advanced, the most sensible way of accommodating the
economics, convenience, and fairness of the parties is to
resolve the remaining negligence claims in federal court.
Previously Denied Claims and Motions
response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, Wani
dedicates significant sections of his brief to revisiting and
rehashing issues that have already been resolved and are not
properly before the court. For example, Wani repeatedly
insists that this court must re-evaluate the claims against
Dr. Croy. Pl. Resp. 2, 7, 14, ECF #219. However, the court
has already granted summary judgment on those claims.
See Opinion and Order 10, ECF #209.
also argues it is necessary for the court to “bring
back [the] formerly dismissed defendants . . . for a full
resolution of this case.” Pl. Resp. 4-5, ECF #219. Wani
voluntarily dismissed all claims against Providence, and the
claims against the other defendants-aside from Boughton,
Casey, and GFU-were dismissed after full briefing and vetting
of the issues. See ECF #53; Opinion and Order 10,
ECF #209. As such, the claims against those former defendants
have been fully resolved and cannot be resurrected.
further contends that “there are still discoverable
documents that relat[e] directly to the disputable material
facts that the defendants have [and] are still withholding
and further discovery is needed.” Pl. Resp. 4, ECF
#219. However, this issue too has already been resolved. Wani
filed a motion to compel ...