United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division
OPINION & ORDER
MICHAEL McSHANE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Bradley William
Monical's Amended Motion to Vacate or Correct Sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 89. Defendant also
moves for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 102. For the
reasons set forth below, the Amended Motion under § 2255
is DENIED. Because the motion and record conclusively show
that Defendant is entitled to no relief, no evidentiary
hearing is required. Defendant's motion for appointment
of counsel is also DENIED.
August 1, 2013, Defendant Bradley William Monical was
indicted in the District of Oregon for three counts of Armed
Bank Robbery (Counts 1, 3, and 5) and two counts of
Possessing a Firearm in Furtherance of a Violent Crime
(Counts 2 and 4). ECF No 1. The charges stemmed from the
November 9, 2010 robbery of a bank in Medford, Oregon (Counts
1 and 2); the December 20, 2010, robbery of a bank in Klamath
Falls, Oregon (Counts 3 and 4); and the June 11, 2010,
robbery of a bank in Redmond, Oregon (Count 5).
bank robberies covered by the Oregon indictment were part of
a spree of robberies Monical committed in several states
during 2010 and 2011. Monical was also federally charged with
Bank Robbery in the District of Idaho for the August 27,
2010, robbery of a Wells Fargo Bank, and with three counts of
Armed Bank Robbery in the Eastern District of Washington for
the September 4, 2010, robbery of a bank in Walla Walla,
Washington (Count 1); the October 2, 2010, robbery of a bank
in Kennewick, Washington (Count 2); and the December 2, 2010,
robbery of a bank in Spokane Valley, Washington (Count 3).
See Presentence Report (“PSR”)
¶¶ 7-10. ECF No. 53.
March 21, 2012, Monical was interviewed by the FBI while in
custody at the Jackson County Jail. PSR ¶ 27.
Monical's then-attorney was present for the interview.
Id. During that interview, Monical confessed to the
robberies covered by the federal indictments. PSR
¶¶ 28-36. In addition, Monical confessed to robbing
Oregon banks in Ashland, Coos Bay, and Salem.
Id.At the time of the PSR, Monical had been
convicted in Oregon state court of the April 29, 2011,
robbery of a bank in Coos Bay, Oregon and the December 16,
2010, robbery of a bank in Ashland, Oregon. PSR ¶¶
106-07. Monical was also facing state charges related to the
bank robberies in Salem, Oregon. PSR ¶ 35.
statement to the FBI, Monical told the agents that he had
committed a number of the robberies with the assistance of
his cousin, Tucker White, with one acting as the
“getaway driver” while the other entered the
bank. PSR ¶ 31-36. During the bank robbery in Coos Bay,
Monical was apprehended by police before he could reach the
vehicle were White was waiting for him. PSR ¶ 36. White
escaped from police but was later found dead in an apparent
November 19, 2012, Monical escaped from the Jackson County
Jail. PSR ¶ 108. Monical remained a fugitive until
November 2013, when he was apprehended by U.S. Marshals in
Oregon City, Oregon. Id. After his apprehension,
Monical “told authorities he planned his escape from
the first day he was at the Jackson County Jail and that
planned to escape from any future correctional institution to
which he would be moved.” Id.
time of sentencing on his federal charges, Monical had
already been sentenced by the Oregon state courts to a total
of 35 years for bank robbery and escape in Jackson County and
Coos County. PSR ¶¶ 106-08.
was indicted in the District of Oregon while he was a
fugitive. After his apprehension, attorney Terry Kolkey was
appointed to represent Monical on his federal charges. ECF
No. 5. Kolkey negotiated a global resolution to all three of
Monical's federal indictments. Under the terms of the
agreement, Monical would receive a sentence of 384 months and
one day, to be served concurrent to the undischarged term of
imprisonment on Monical's state sentences in the Jackson
County Circuit Court and the Coos County Circuit Court. PSR.
¶ 130; see also Plea Agreement, ECF No. 51.
29, 2015, Monical entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to the
plea agreement. ECF No. 49. On November 16, 2015, Monical was
sentenced consistent with the plea agreement to 384 months
and one day, to be served concurrent to the undischarged term
of imprisonment for his state sentences. ECF No. 61.
28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner in custody under
sentence may move the court that imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence on the ground
[T]he sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
warrant relief, a petitioner must demonstrate that the error
of constitutional magnitude had a substantial and injurious
effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's
verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637
(1993); see also United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d
1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We hold now that
Brecht's harmless error standard applies to
habeas cases under section 2255, just as it does to those
under section 2254.”).
§ 2255, “a district court must grant a hearing to
determine the validity of a petition brought under that
section, ‘[u]nless the motions and the files and
records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief.'” United
States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994)
(alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255). In determining whether a § 2255 motion
requires a hearing, “[t]he standard essentially is
whether the movant has made specific factual allegations
that, if true, state a claim on which relief could be
granted.” United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d
1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original, internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court may
dismiss a § 2255 motion based on a facial review of the
record “only if the allegations in the motion, when
viewed against the record, do not give rise to a claim for
relief or are ‘palpably incredible or patently
frivolous.'” Id. at 1062-63 (quoting
United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717 (9th
Cir. 1984)); see United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d
1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1980). Conclusory statements in a §
2255 motion are insufficient to require a hearing.
Hearst, 638 F.2d at 1194.
brings this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging (1)
that his guilty plea in this case was not knowing or
voluntary and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.Monical now claims that he is innocent of
the charges and that he falsely confessed and falsely pleaded
preliminary matter, Monical devotes a considerable amount of
time to arguing that he is innocent of the bank robberies in
Salem, Oregon. This includes the submission of a Salem police
report. Pet. Ex. 9, ECF No. 89-2. Monical was not charged
federally for those offenses, however, and this Court has no
power to consider the validity of those state convictions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In addition, those offenses had
not been adjudicated at the time of Monical's sentencing
on the federal convictions. Monical's assertions and
arguments concerning his eventual conviction for the Salem
robberies are not relevant to this motion.
Voluntary Guilty Plea
of a guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and
“done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Iaea v.
Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986). In cases
involving collateral attack on a guilty plea, the Supreme
Court had held that “[s]olemn declarations in open
court carry a strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
“The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations