United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL W. MOSMAN, CHIEF UNITED STATED DISTRICT JUDGE
MCJI, Nora Mains, Michael Reeves, Mark Swanson, MCSO, MCDC,
Captain Alexander, and Captain Wheeler (collectively
"Defendants") move for summary judgment in their
favor. For the reasons discussed below, I GRANT
Defendants' Motion  for Summary Judgment.
the pendency of this lawsuit, plaintiff notified the Court
that she had changed her name from Colby Lee Aplin to Colby
Lee Ramos ("Ramos"). . Accordingly, I refer to
her in this Order and Opinion as Ramos.
brings this pro se Amended Complaint against Defendants under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Multnomah County Jail
"Officers and Facility Officials' prisoner mail
policies violates her constitutional rights." [6 at pp.
7-9]. Specifically, she claims the restrictions on prisoner
mail containing material encouraging or portraying sexual
activity limited her ability to receive mail from her
husband. [Id. at p. 6]. She asserts that Defendant
Mains has rejected "90% of her mail," including
mail from her husband and legal material from the trial
division and the U.S. Courthouse. [Id. at pp. 6-7].
She claims that the sharing of photocopies of her confiscated
mail in staff meetings constitutes an unreasonable search and
seizure. [Id. at p. 7]. She also seeks "access
to her true name on envelopes and inmate wrist identification
band." [Mat 12].
seek summary judgment on Ramos's claims. Ramos has filed
a Response and two declarations in opposition to
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of
material fact, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A
genuine dispute of a material fact is "one that could
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party."
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.
2004). The initial burden for a motion for summary judgment
is on the moving party to identify the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once that burden is satisfied, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, through
the production of evidence, that there remains a
"genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324.
non-moving party may not rely on the pleading allegations,
Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044,
1049 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)), or
"unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements,"
Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107,
1112 (9th Cir. 2003). All reasonable doubts and inferences to
be drawn from the facts are to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). The district court should "construe liberally
motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and
should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly."
Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted). This rule exempts pro se inmates
from strict compliance with the summary judgment rules, but
it does not exempt them from all compliance. Blaisdell v.
Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013). For
instance, pro se inmates must still identify evidence
supporting their claims. Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d
1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) (even if the petitioner's
filings were construed liberally, he still failed to identify
evidence supporting his claim).
argue they are entitled to summary judgment because Ramos
failed to exhaust her available prison administrative
remedies on all but one of her claims as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") and that her
only exhausted claim fails as a matter of law. Defendants
also argue that Ramos's claims under the Oregon
Constitution fail as a matter of law and that she has failed
to allege personal involvement in the violation of her
Constitutional rights by Defendants Reese, Alexander, and
Wheeler. In the alternative, Defendants argue qualified
immunity shields them from Ramos's claim for money
No Private Right of Action under the Oregon
asserts the mail policy violates her rights to free speech
and to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the
Oregon Constitution. Defendants correctly assert that claims
for damages may not be brought directly under the Oregon
Constitution. Hunter v. City of Eugene, 787 Or. 298,
304, 787 P.2d 881 (1990) ("Oregon's Bill of Rights
provides no textual or historical basis for implying a right
to damages for constitutional violations.").
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Ramos's claims under the Oregon Constitution.
Failure to Exhaust ...