United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division
OPINION & ORDER
MICHAEL MCSHANE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25. The Court has
determined that this motion is appropriate for resolution
without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, the
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
following factual summary is derived from the First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 16, and the docket
entries for the related action, Matthew Wilson v.
Decibels of Oregon et al., Case No. 1:16-cv-00855-CL.
Ryan Hemming was employed by Defendant Decibels of Oregon,
Inc. as an installation technician from September or October,
2009, through May 22, 2016. FAC ¶¶ 8-10.
7, 2017, Plaintiff sought to join an earlier-filed Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action case,
Matthew Wilson v. Decibels of Oregon et al., Case
No. 1:16-cv- 00855-CL (the “Matthew Wilson
case”), as an opt-in plaintiff. See ECF No. 43
of Case No. 1:16-cv-08550-CL. The Matthew Wilson
plaintiff moved for FLSA class certification. Judge Clarke
recommended that class certification be denied on the basis
that the putative class members were not similarly situated
and, on August 31, 2017, this Court adopted that
recommendation. ECF Nos. 82, 96 of Case No. 1:16-cv-08550-CL.
Denial of class certification resulted in the involuntary
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims without prejudice. FAC
¶ 16. The Matthew Wilson plaintiff proceeded
with his individual claims, which were ultimately resolved by
settlement agreement on April 24, 2018. ECF No. 115 of Case
No. 1:16-cv-00855-CL. Plaintiff did not appeal the denial of
conditional certification following entry of final judgment
in the Matthew Wilson case.
initiated this action on October 15, 2017. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff alleges that he and other similarly situated
installation technicians were subjected an unfair and
unlawful system of payment while employed by Defendants,
which deprived them of wages for time spent working and
overtime pay to which they were entitled. As in the
Matthew Wilson case, Plaintiff is pursuing
collective action on behalf of similarly situated
installation technicians. Plaintiff filed a written consent
to join in this action on April 5, 2018. ECF No. 18.
judgment is appropriate if the record shows that “there
is no genuine dispute as to any materials fact and the
[moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue
determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Servs.,
Inc. v. Pac. Elect Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626,
630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party determines the authenticity of the dispute.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Caltrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party
shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify
facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at
rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary
judgment motion: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the
existence of genuine issues of material fact should be
resolved against the moving party; and (2) all inferences
drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec.,
809 F.2d at 630.
move for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's
FLSA collective action claim on the basis that it is
action brought under the FLSA must be commenced within two
years after the cause of action accrues, unless the case
involves a “willful violation, ” in which case
the limitations period is extended to three years. 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a). “An FLSA cause of action accrues
‘at each regular payday immediately following the work
period during which the services were rendered for which the
wage or overtime compensation is claimed.'”
Frye v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 495 Fed.Appx.
669, 675 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hughes v. Region VII
Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 187 (6th Cir.
2008)). Collective action claims are subject to an additional
In determining when an action is commenced for purposes of
section 255 of this title, an action commenced on or after
May 14, 1947 under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended . . . shall be considered commenced on the date when
the complaint is filed; except that in the case of a
collective or class action instituted under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended . . . it shall be
considered commenced in the case of any individual claimant-
(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is
specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint and
his written consent to become a party plaintiff is filed on
such date ...