In the Matter of E. R., a Child.
C. L. R. Appellant. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,
Submitted December 20, 2018
Clackamas County Circuit Court 18JU02888 Heather Karabeika,
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section,
and Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public
Defense Services, fled the brief for appellant.
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor
General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General,
fled the brief for respondent.
Hadlock, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and Aoyagi,
Summary: In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals a
judgment asserting dependency jurisdiction over child on the
basis that mother's mental health impairs her parenting
ability following an episode in which mother decompensated.
Mother contends that the record does not include evidence
sufficient to establish that, at the time of the dependency
hearing, her mental health put child at risk of serious loss
or injury that was reasonably likely to be realized.
Held: The juvenile court erred. The Department of
Human Services did not prove that, at the time of the
dependency hearing, mother's mental health presented a
threat of serious loss or injury to child that was reasonably
likely to be realized. Nothing in the record supported a
finding that mother will suffer a comparable episode of
decompensation in the future or that mother's mental
health put child at risk of serious loss or injury.
Or.App. 750] HADLOCK, P. J.
appeals a juvenile court judgment asserting dependency
jurisdiction over her 12-year-old, E, on the basis that
mother's mental health problems impair her parenting
ability. Mother contends that the record in the juvenile
court proceeding does not include evidence sufficient to
establish that, at the time of the dependency hearing, her
mental health challenges put E at risk of serious harm or
loss that was reasonably likely to be realized. For the
reasons set out below, we agree that the record in this case
is not sufficient to justify the juvenile court's
exercise of dependency jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse.
has not requested de novo review and this is not an
exceptional case in which such review would be appropriate.
Accordingly, in reviewing the juvenile court's judgment,
we "view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by
permissible derivative inferences, in the light most
favorable to the trial court's disposition and assess
whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to
permit that outcome." Dept. of Human Services v. N.
P., 257 Or.App. 633, 639, 307 P.3d 444 (2013). We are
bound by the juvenile court's explicit and necessarily
implied findings of historical fact as long as any evidence
in the record supports them. Id. at 639-40. We
describe the facts consistently with those standards.
has longstanding mental health issues. By her own report, she
has been a patient at Western Psychological and Counseling
Services since she was nine years old. Her treatment provider
since November 2016 is psychiatric nurse practitioner
Rosanski, who manages mother's medications. Those
medications are for several diagnosed conditions, including
bipolar disorder, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
attention deficit disorder. At the dependency hearing,
mother, testified about her PTSD, which she said was caused
by having been violently victimized. Mother acknowledged that
she has "a long list" of additional diagnoses, but
she was not able to identify what all of them are. Nor did
mother recall the names of all of her medications.
Or.App. 751] On the evening of April 2, 2018, mother had what
she later described as a "mental breakdown." Mother
mistakenly thought that somebody had intruded or was
attempting to intrude into the apartment where she and E
lived. She thought she heard a drill and believed that
"somebody was trying to get in the house." Mother,
describing herself as having been "very paranoid,"
"went in attack mode," and started throwing things
at the imagined intruder, to protect herself and E. Mother
took E to a neighbor's apartment, stayed there for about
15 minutes, then went to another neighbor's apartment for
a similar length of time before returning home. At that
point, E was tired, upset, and crying.
called 9-1-1 a few times and, because she did not believe
that police were responding quickly enough, falsely stated
that she had slit her own throat. Mother also called father,
with whom she was in frequent contact although they had
separated a few years earlier. Father described mother as
"kind of freaking out" that night and "talking
erratically." Mother asked father to come get her and E
so he could move them into his home. In a second phone call,
mother said that father needed to come get E, but she did not
explain why. However, given how mother was speaking and how
frustrated she seemed, "it seemed like a major
emergency" to father. E then called father, who
testified that she "was crying, and she was
officers and personnel from the Department of Human Services
(DHS) responded to mother's 9-1-1 calls. Officers took
mother to a hospital, where she received treatment for a few
days. She then checked herself in to another facility
"because [she] still wasn't okay." Mother
stayed there for two or ...