Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

In re J. S. W.

Court of Appeals of Oregon

December 12, 2018

In the Matter of J. S. W., a Youth.
v.
J. S. W., Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent,

          Yamhill County Circuit Court J8405; Ladd J. Wiles, Judge.

          Submitted December 11, 2017

          Christa Obold Eshleman fled the briefs for appellant.

          Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, fled the brief for respondent.

          Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Shorr, Judge.

         Case Summary: Youth appeals from the juvenile court's denial of his motion to set aside a 1995 juvenile delinquency adjudication for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.427, and sodomy in the second degree, ORS 163.395. Youth argued that his adjudication was invalid because he had not knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to counsel or entered a valid plea due to the juvenile court's failure to inform him of a potential statutory defense and a collateral consequence-mandatory sex-offender registration-of his plea. As to the latter argument, youth's principal contention was that his case is analogous to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 175 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), in which the United States Supreme Court determined that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to be informed whether deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea. The result, youth argued, was a violation of his due process rights under the United States Constitution. The juvenile court denied youth's motion, determining that youth had failed to meet his burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the adjudication should be set aside. Youth reprises his arguments on appeal. Held: The juvenile court did not err. First, the juvenile court in 1995 was [295 Or.App. 421] not required to inform youth of any potential statutory defenses in order to obtain a valid waiver of counsel and voluntary plea. Second, Padilla does not apply retroactively and, therefore, youth was not entitled to its application as a matter of right at his 1995 juvenile proceeding.

         Affirmed.

         [295 Or.App. 422] SHORR, J.

         Youth appeals a judgment and order of the juvenile court denying his motion to set aside a 1995 juvenile delinquency adjudication for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.427, and sodomy in the second degree, ORS 163.395. Youth argued in his motion that the adjudication was invalid because he had not knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to counsel or entered a valid plea due to the juvenile court's alleged failure to inform him of a potential statutory defense and a collateral consequence- mandatory sex-offender registration-of his plea. The court denied youth's motion, determining that youth had failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the adjudication should be set aside. On appeal, youth reiterates the arguments that he made to the juvenile court, namely that his "federal constitutional rights were violated by lack of counsel in the underlying proceeding, which led to a plea that was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent."[1] For the reasons explained below, we affirm the court's denial of youth's motion.

         The juvenile court has the authority to "set aside any order made by it," ORS 419C.610(1), for reasons including a "substantial denial in the proceedings resulting in the person's adjudication * * * of the person's rights under the United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution, or both," if "the denial rendered the adjudication void," ORS 4l9C.6l5(1)(a). A youth who files a motion to set aside a juvenile adjudication that the youth argues resulted from an invalid, uncounseled plea has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plea was invalid. See ORS 4l9C.6l5(2)(b) (providing that the "petitioner has the [295 Or.App. 423] burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts alleged in the petition").

         We review the juvenile court's construction of a constitutional provision for legal error. State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 298, 977 P.2d 379 (1999). We are bound by the court's factual findings that are supported by evidence in the record, including a finding that a party's evidence is not "sufficiently persuasive." State v. Johnson, 335 Or. 511, 523, 73 P.3d 282 (2003).

         We provide the following facts as context for the juvenile court's denial of youth's motion. Youth was 14 at the time of the charged incident and 16 at the time of the 1995 juvenile adjudication. The victim was 12 years old at the time of the charged incident. Before trial in Yamhill County Circuit Court, youth waived his right to counsel and subsequently admitted to the charges that brought him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Youth signed a document captioned "Petition Admitting Allegations That Child is Within the Jurisdiction of the Court. Waiver of Right to an Attorney." Paragraph 3 of the petition provided that youth had the "right to have an attorney." Paragraph 4 provided that youth was "entitled to an attorney at all times either in Court or when questioned about this matter" and that youth "may hire an attorney" or have one appointed by the court if youth was "without sufficient funds." Following paragraphs 3 and 4, the petition presented youth with a check-the-box option to "proceed without an attorney representing me at this time" or to be "represented by an attorney," and he checked the box next to "proceed without an attorney representing me at this time."

         Paragraph 6 of the petition claimed that the "maximum penalty" that youth could face by admitting to the charges was up to 20 years of confinement and a fine of up to $400, 000. Paragraph 12 provided that youth offered his admission "freely and voluntarily and of my own accord and with full understanding of these matters." Significant to this appeal, the plea petition did not contain a notice that youth would have to register as a sex offender if he admitted to the charges against him and did not notify youth of any possible defenses that he could raise instead of admitting to the [295 Or.App. 424] charges against him. The record does not contain any other evidence of whether the juvenile court, in a colloquy with youth or through other means, informed youth of the collateral consequences of his plea, including mandatory sex-offender registration, or advised youth of the specific risks of entering a plea without first consulting with an attorney[2]

         Youth's plea in 1995 admitting to the allegations contained in the sodomy and sexual abuse charges resulted in a mandatory lifetime obligation to register as a sex offender. ORS 181.594 - 181.596. In 2014, youth was charged with failure to report as a sex offender in Multnomah County. See ORS 163A.040. In response, youth filed a motion in that court to set aside his 1995 juvenile adjudication. He submitted an affidavit in support of his motion in which he averred that, during the 1995 proceedings, he "was not informed" that he had an age-based defense under ORS 163.345[3] or that he "would be subject to lifetime sex offender registration" as a result of his plea. Although the basis for its decision is absent from the record, the Multnomah County court entered a one-line order that "granted" defendant's "pretrial motion re. challenge to prior conviction."[4] The court subsequently entered a judgment dismissing the failure-to-register charge against youth. The judgment provides that "all counts are dismissed on motion of the state as it is unable to proceed." The basis for the state's motion to ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.