United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division
OPINION & ORDER
AIKEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 16, 2018, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs First Amended
Complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 68. Plaintiff timely
filed a Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 69, and this matter
comes before the Court on separate Motions to Dismiss filed
by Defendant David R. Robinson and Defendant Lisa Moore. ECF
Nos. 74, 75. The Court has determined that this case is
appropriate for resolution without oral
argument. For the reasons set forth below, the
motions are GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.
convoluted history of this case was set forth at some length
in this Court's Opinion and Order on the Motions to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 68, and will not
be fully reproduced here.
alleged in the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"),
Plaintiff Daniel Mike Chavez ("Chavez") was
convicted of two counts of Attempted Sex Abuse in the First
Degree and two counts of Private Indecency following a jury
trial in the Klamath County Circuit Court on March 20,
2009. The state court sentenced Chavez to sixty
months of probation on the first count of Attempted Sex Abuse
and to eighteen months in prison, followed by sixty months of
post-prison supervision ("PPS") on the second count
of Attempted Sex Abuse. Chavez received a concurrent sentence
of thirty days in jail for the two counts of Private
appealed both his conviction and his sentence, but his appeal
remained pending when he completed his prison term and
returned to Klamath County. Upon his release from prison,
Chavez commenced his term of PPS. Defendant Lisa Moore
("Moore") was assigned as Chavez's probation
condition of his probation and PPS, Chavez was required to
participate in a sex offender treatment
program. Moore directed Chavez to attend treatment
sessions provided by Defendant David Robinson
("Robinson") through his company, Correctional
Evaluation and Treatment, Inc. ("CET").
began treatment with CET in June 2010. Before treatment
began, Chavez was presented with a No. of "mandatory
admittance" forms. These forms required, among other
things, that Chavez admit to the conduct underlying his
convictions. Chavez was also directed to sign a "release
of information" form, which permitted Robinson to share
with Moore any information disclosed by Chavez during
was concerned that admiting to the offense conduct would
prejudice his pending appeal and asked to speak to an
attorney. Robinson told Chavez that the admission and the
release of information were required by the program. Chavez
refused to sign the documents. Robinson discharged Chavez
from the program and notified Moore.
initiated PPS sanction proceedings against Chavez. Chavez was
found to be in violation of the sex offender treatment
requirement of his PPS and was given a jail sanction.
August 2010 Chavez was once again directed to attend sex
offender treatment with CET. Robinson presented Chavez with
the mandatory admission and release of information documents
and Chavez once again refused to sign. Robinson terminated
Chavez from the program and notified Moore. Moore initiated a
second round of PPS sanction proceedings against Chavez.
Chavez was found to be in violation of the sex offender
treatment condition of his PPS and a second jail sanction was
imposed against him.
the SAC does not expressly discuss it, the record shows that
Chavez's appellate counsel sought an order from the state
court staying imposition of sex offender treatment pending
resolution of Chavez's appeal on August 11, 2010. See
Opinion & Order 4, n.2, ECF No. 68; Chavez v.
Robinson, Ninth Circuit No. 14-35384, Dkt. No. 23. On
September 1, 2010, the state court issued an order granting
Chavez immunity for any statements made during sex offender
treatment concerning the conduct underlying his convictions.
March 9, 2011, Chavez filed this federal civil rights action
against Moore and Robinson. ECF No. 1. On March 10, 2011,
Chavez once again attended sex offender treatment with CET.
See Violation and Structured Sanction Reporting Form, ECF No.
7-1. Despite the state court's grant of immunity, Chavez
again refused to participate in treatment. Chavez also
informed Robinson that he had filed this federal lawsuit
against him. Robinson regarded the situation as an
"ethical dilemma" and determined that he could
"no longer provide direct therapeutic service to Mr.
Chavez as he has decided to take legal action against
me." Id. Robinson also reported that Chavez
"has made it clear that he does not intend to cooperate
with sexual offender specific treatment while attending my
program." Id. In his final report, Robinson
In closing, I will no longer allow Mr. Chavez to return to
participate in this treatment program as he has filed for an
appeal of his original conviction supporting his denial of
sexual offense behavior; and, he has delivered upon me a
certified mail document indicating his intent to file a
"Civil Complaint with Damages" against me and
anyone else he can. In my last meeting with Mr. Chavez, he
was dismissed from the interview room as uncooperative and
advised that he could discuss his termination from sexual
offender treatment with you.
and Structured Sanction Reporting Form, ECF No. 7-1.
March 22, 2011, Moore once again initiated PPS sanction
proceedings and Chavez was jailed for a third time for
failure to participate in sex offender treatment.
February 15, 2012, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed
Chavez's conviction based on the state's concession
of error and remanded the case to the Klamath County Circuit
Court.State v. Chavez, 248 Or.App. 260
(2012). On remand, Chavez accepted a plea agreement by which
he agreed to enter a plea of no contest to a single count of
Attempted Sex Abuse in the First Degree. Naumes Decl. Ex. 2,
ECF No. 51-1. The state agreed to dismiss the remaining
counts and to recommend a sentence of time served with a
requirement that Chavez register as a sex offender.
Id. On February 13, 2014, the state court accepted
Chavez's plea and judgment was entered accordingly.
Naumes Decl. Ex. 1.
plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted," the court must dismiss the action.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In order to state a viable claim, a
plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This
means a complaint must contain "factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The complaint must ...