and submitted March 16, 2017
County Circuit Court 15CR10709, 15CR10710, 15CR10711,
15CR10712 R. Curtis Conover, Judge.
Michaels argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Schmidt argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief
were Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C. and Ben Miller.
Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Judge, and Wilson,
appeals his judgments of conviction for four counts of
criminal trespass in the second degree. He assigns error to
the trial court's denial of his motions for judgment of
acquittal, arguing that the underlying trespass notice he
received-which was issued after he was found sleeping in a
locked building on the University of Oregon's campus-was
unconstitutional because it violated his due process rights.
trial court did not err. Because defendant did not identify
any constitutionally protected interest that was infringed by
the notice of trespass, the Court of Appeals cannot determine
any process was due in depriving him of that interest.
Or.App. 820] ORTEGA, P. J.
was charged with four counts of criminal trespass in the
second degree in violation of Eugene City Code (ECC)
4.807. He was found guilty on all counts in
municipal court and appealed to the circuit court, where he
was convicted of those crimes. On appeal, defendant raises three
assignments of error. However, we reject defendant's
second assignment of error without written discussion,
writing only to address his first and third assignments, in
which he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
motions for judgment of acquittal. Defendant received a
notice of trespass after he was found sleeping in a locked
University of Oregon (UO) building and, because he violated
that notice, he received four citations for criminal trespass
in the second degree, which resulted in the convictions at
issue. He contends that the underlying notice was unlawful,
as it did not provide due process to allow him to challenge
its constitutionality and, as a result, the trial court
should have granted his motions for judgment of acquittal. We
conclude that, because defendant has not identified any
constitutionally protected interest that was infringed by the
notice of trespass, we cannot determine that any process was
due in depriving him of that interest. Therefore, we affirm.
reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the city to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
that it proved the elements of the crime. State v.
Barnes, 232 Or.App. 70, 72, 220 P.3d 1195 (2009).
was found asleep in a building on UO's main campus after
it was closed and locked. An officer questioned defendant
and, after concluding that he "had no authorized basis
to be in the building at that time," issued a notice of
trespass to defendant. The notice provided that defendant was
excluded from campus buildings and any other property owned
by UO (including streets, sidewalks, and parking lots) for 18
months, and that if he returned [294 Or.App. 821] without
prior approval from the UO chief of police or a designee,
"he would be treated as a trespasser." The notice
also stated that he could appeal that status to UO's
chief of police. Through an attorney, defendant wrote a
letter to the chief challenging the constitutionality of the
notice of trespass, but the chief denied his appeal "on