United States District Court, D. Oregon
OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. MCSHANE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
J & J Sports Productions, Inc. moves this Court for a
default judgment and damages pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
55(b)(2). Pl.'s Mot., ECF No. 17, 1. For the reasons set
forth below, Plaintiff's motion, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED.
brought this action against Defendants Sotero Enciso-Chavez
and Soten LLC- operating as 7 Mares Restaurant and Bar
(“7 Mares”)-on September 11, 2017. Pl.'s
Compl., ECF No. 1, 1. Plaintiff alleges that Enciso-Chavez,
by himself or through his employees, directed or permitted 7
Mares to intercept, broadcast, and/or publish the Floyd
Mayweather Jr. v. Andre Berto WBA/WBC Welterweight
Championship Fight Program (“the program”)
on September 12, 2015. Pl.'s Compl. ECF No. 1, 4.
Plaintiff had exclusive nationwide commercial distribution
rights to the program and entered into sublicensing
agreements throughout North America, including Oregon,
permitting commercial establishments to publicly display the
program. Pl.'s Compl., ECF No. 1, 4-5. Defendants did not
enter into such an agreement. See id. at 7.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unlawfully intercepted,
received, and exhibited the program in violation of Title 47
U.S.C. § 605, et seq. with full knowledge that
it was illegal to do so. Id. at 5.
seeks $10, 000 in statutory damages under §
605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II), $30, 000 in enhanced statutory damages
under § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), $3, 000 for trespass of
chattels, and attorney's fees and costs under §
605(e)(3)(B)(iii). Pl's Mot., ECF No. 17, 3.
served Defendants by officer service to a manager at the
establishment on September 21, 2017, and by mail on October
9, 2017. ECF Nos. 7 and 8. Plaintiff also effectuated service
by officer service on September 21, 2017 and mail on October
9, 2017 to the last-known addresses of Sotero Enciso-Chavez
and Soten LLC. ECF Nos. 9 and 10. Plaintiff then filed and
served Defendants and their attorney, Scott Howard, by mail
with a Notice of Intent to Take Default Against All
Defendants on December 1, 2017. ECF No. 11. Mr. Howard
briefly represented Defendants in this matter and allegedly
contacted Plaintiff's representative to discuss the
possibility of settlement. Pl.'s Mot., ECF No. 17, 4; Orr
Decl., ECF No. 18, ¶ 13. Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Entry of Default on January 19, 2018. ECF No. 12. This Court
granted Plaintiff's Motion on February 12, 2018. ECF No.
have not filed any responsive pleadings or notice of intent
defendant must file a responsive pleading within 21 days of
being served, or within 60 days if the defendant has timely
waived service. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1). “When a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party's default.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a).
entering an order of default, the district court has
discretion to issue a default judgment. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b); DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847,
852 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 937
(2008). This Court has "considerable leeway as to what
it may require as a prerequisite to the entry of a default
judgment." TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal,
826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (footnote
omitted). This Court may take the complaint's
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, other than the
amount of damages. Id. at 917-18 (citation omitted);
Huynh, 503 F.3d at 854 (citations omitted); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). “However, a
‘defendant is not held to admit facts that are not
well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.'”
Huynh, 503 F.3d at 854 (quoting Nishimatsu
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,
1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Entry of Default Judgment
considering an entry of default judgment, this Court examines
the seven Eitel factors:
(1) [T]he possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2)
the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the
sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake
in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning
material facts; (6) whether the default was due to
excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the