and Submitted December 5, 2017
Clatsop County Circuit Court 15CR23340; Cindee S. Matyas,
Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for
appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief
Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Offce of Public Defense
Christopher Page, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor
DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Aoyagi,
Summary: Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
interfering with a peace officer, ORS 162.247, arising out of
defendant's failure to obey a police officer's order
to leave a public city council meeting after defendant spoke
out of turn and refused to comply with the mayor's
request that he leave. Defendant argues that the court erred
in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the
police officer's order was not "lawful" under
Oregon's Public Meetings Law, ORS 192.610 to 192.690.
Held: The trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. Because
the Public Meetings Law does not prevent governmental bodies
from maintaining order at public meetings, the officer's
order, which derived from the mayor's authority, was
lawful on its face.
Or.App. 390] EGAN, C. JUDGE
appeals a judgment of conviction for interfering with a peace
officer, ORS 162.247, arising out of his failure to obey a
police officer's order to leave a public meeting of the
Astoria City Council after he spoke out of turn and refused
to obey the mayor's request that he leave. Defendant
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal. Additionally, defendant argues that
the imposition of certain conditions of probation and a $100
fee were inappropriate. We affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal;
decline to address the special conditions of probation as we
have concluded that that issue is moot; and decline to
exercise our discretion to reverse the imposition of the $100
fee. Accordingly, we affirm.
reviewing the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal, we view the facts in the
light most favorable to the state and draw all reasonable
inferences in the state's favor. State v.
Lupoli, 348 Or. 346, 366, 234 P.3d 117 (2010).
mayor of Astoria began a city council meeting with discussion
about a communication tower. The mayor allowed public comment
on the tower both during and at the end of the discussion.
After closing the discussion, the mayor asked if anyone
objected to the council's jurisdiction to hear the next
item on the agenda. At that point, defendant came up to the
podium and began to speak about the communication tower. The
mayor explained that defendant had missed his opportunity to
address that issue, but defendant continued to talk and told
the mayor, "You're under citizen's arrest."
The mayor asked defendant to leave council chambers, but
defendant refused and began to give the mayor
Chief Bradley Johnston, who was attending the council
meeting, asked the mayor if she wanted defendant removed. The
mayor said yes, so Johnston approached the podium and showed
his badge to defendant. Defendant greeted the chief by
saying, "Hello, Chief Johnston. You're under arrest
as well." Johnston asked and then ordered defendant to
leave, but defendant refused. Johnston touched [294 Or.App.
391] defendant's arm, and defendant pulled away, turned,
and made movements suggesting he was going to swing at
Johnston. Johnston forced defendant to the ground. Defendant
tried to get up and push Johnston away, while
"ranting" about conspiracies and asking the
attendees for help. When other officers arrived, defendant
cooperated and was escorted out of the meeting.
state charged defendant with interference with a peace
officer, as well as second-degree disorderly conduct and
second-degree trespass. The case proceeded to a jury trial,
where defendant represented himself with the assistance of a
court-appointed legal advisor. At the close of evidence,
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the count of
interfering with a peace officer on the grounds that the
order that defendant refused to obey was not lawful. The
court denied the motion, stating:
"[I]t appears to be undisputed evidence that the mayor,
who we've established has taken an oath of office, has
the directive to run the city council meetings and has the
authority to preside over them and remove people, and made a
decision to remove someone, you, and requested law
enforcement assistance for that removal. * * * And I guess it
was the question of whether or not that's a lawful order,
and that's something that the jury can ...