United States District Court, D. Oregon
OPINION AND ORDER
HONORABLE PAUL PAPAK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Hemy Melendez, an incarcerated prisoner proceeding pro
se and in forma pauper is, filed this action
against defendants Dr. Garth Gulick, Dr, Bristol, and Brad
Cain on November 13, 2017. By and through his complaint as
originally filed, Melendez appeared to allege all
defendants' liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the
violation of his Eighth Amendment and, apparently, Fourteenth
Amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment,
as well as all defendants' liability under the Oregon
Constitution for violation of the same right. In support of
his claims, Melendez alleged purportedly wrongful conduct of
Gulick and Bristol (specifically, those defendants'
alleged denial of adequate medical treatment in connection
with Melendez' complained-of shoulder pain), but offered
no allegation that Cain had participated in the alleged
deprivation of his rights.
November 20, 2017, Judge Mosman dismissed Melendez'
claim(s) to the extent alleged against Cain, on the ground
that there was no allegation from which it could be inferred
that Cain participated in the alleged wrongful conduct, and
additionally dismissed Melendez' claim(s) to the extent
alleged to arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, on the
ground that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee the
right of incarcerated prisoners to receive adequate medical
care. Judge Mosman granted Melendez leave to amend his
pleading to cure its identified deficiencies within thirty
days. On November 29, 2017, Melendez amended his complaint,
abandoning his claim(s) to the extent alleged against Cain
and clarifying that his claim arising out of alleged denial
of adequate medical care arises under the Eighth Amendment
and the Oregon Constitution only.
through his amended complaint, Melendez argues that remaining
defendants Gulick and Bristol improperly delayed his receipt
of medical treatment for his complained-of shoulder pain and
ultimately provided inadequate medical treatment for that
condition. Arising out of the foregoing, Melendez appears to
allege defendants' liability under Section 1983 in both
their official and their individual capacities for the
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical
care while incarcerated and under the Oregon Constitution for
violation of that same right. Melendez seeks award of
compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $4
million. This court has federal question jurisdiction over
Melendez' Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and may properly exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Melendez' Oregon Constitutional claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
before the court is defendants' motion (#23) for summaiy
judgment. I have considered the motion and all of the
pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth
below, defendants' motion (#23) for summaiy judgment is
judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party taking the position that a
material fact either "cannot be or is genuinely
disputed" must support that position either by citation
to specific evidence of record "including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for puiposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials," by showing that the evidence of record
does not establish either the presence or absence of such a
dispute, or by showing that an opposing party is unable to
produce sufficient admissible evidence to establish the
presence or absence of such a dispute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The substantive law governing a claim or defense determines
whether a fact is material. See Morelandv. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep't, 159 F.3d365, 369 (9th Cir.
judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for
trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
318, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
411 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Warren v. City of
Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995), cert,
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1261 (1996). In evaluating a motion
for summaiy judgment, the district courts of the United
States must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and may neither make credibility
determinations nor perform any weighing of the evidence.
See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U, S,
545, 554-55 (1990); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Melendez is an incarcerated prisoner currently housed in the
Snake River Correctional Institution ("SRCI").
Defendant Gulick is a physician employed to provide medical
services to prisoners incarcerated at SRCI. Defendant Bristol
is a physician who provided medical services to Melendez.
The Parties' Dispute
Melendez' Allegations in Support of his Claims
not material to resolution of defendants' motion for
summary judgment, I summarize Melendez' allegations in
support of his claims in order to provide context ...