United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
DIANE R. SWEET, Plaintiff,
CLARK COUNTY WA OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE, General Services Department, Clark County WA, ANN CHRISTIAN, Clark County WA Indigent Defense Manager, and ANGELA COLAIUTA, Clark County WA Indigent Defense Coordinator, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
YIM YOU UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
se plaintiff Diane R. Sweet (“Sweet”) is an
attorney admitted to practice in Washington State. She has
brought this breach of contract action against the Clark
County WA Office of Indigent Defense and two of its
employees, Ann Christian and Angela Colaiuta, (collectively
“defendants”). Compl. 2, ECF #2. Before the court
is Sweet's motion for summary judgment (ECF #17) and
defendants' motion to dismiss or transfer for improper
venue (ECF #19). Sweet has filed neither a response to
defendant's motion to dismiss nor a reply in support of
her motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth
below, Sweet's motion for summary judgment (ECF #17)
should be DENIED, defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF #19)
should be GRANTED, and this case should be dismissed.
filed an answer to the complaint on March 8, 2018. Answer,
ECF #14. That same day-before the court had an opportunity to
issue a discovery and pretrial scheduling order-Sweet moved
for summary judgment. Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF #17; LR
16-1(d). The court issued its discovery and pretrial
scheduling order the next day, setting the deadline to
complete discovery for July 9, 2018. ECF #15.
filed an answer on March 8, 2018. ECF #14. On March 12, 2018,
defendants substituted counsel (ECF #18), and approximately
two weeks later, defendants' new counsel moved to dismiss
or transfer for improper venue. ECF #19.
responded to Sweet's motion for summary judgment on March
29, 2018, arguing both that it is premature and that it fails
on the merits. (ECF #21). Although Sweet has been given ample
opportunity, she has not responded to defendants' motion
to dismiss or filed a reply to defendants' response to
her motion for summary judgment.
Sweet's Motion for Summary Judgment
first motion filed in this case was Sweet's motion for
summary judgment. It should be denied because it is
premature. Sweet has also failed to comply with the
certification requirement of Local Rule 7-1.
FRCP 56 allows a party to file a motion for summary judgment
“at any time until 30 days after the close of
discovery, ” the rule also allows the court to continue
or deny the motion when “a nonmovant shows by affidavit
or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition . . . .” FRCP
56(b), (d)(1); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment [may] be
refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity
to discover information that is essential to his
opposition.”); see also Glad-A-Way Gardens, Inc. v.
Lynn Mayer's Great Lakes Glads, Inc., 52 F.3d 333
(9th Cir. 1995); Texas Partners v. Conrock Co., 685
F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. den., 460
U.S. 1029 (1983); Program Eng'g, Inc. v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980).
defendants declare they have had no opportunity to conduct
any discovery and that given the ambiguity of Sweet's
handwritten complaint, discovery is needed to both identify
the nature of the claims and provide a defense. Decl. of
Curtis Burns ¶ 8, ECF #22. This court agrees.
Sweet's motion for summary judgment is premature and
should be denied on that basis.
Lack of Certification
must comply with the district's local rules.
E.g., Mehr v. Cty. of Orange, 484 Fed.Appx.
162, 163 (9th Cir. 2012); Miranda v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983). Sweet did not
comply with the certification requirement of Local Rule 7-1.
Local Rule 7-1(a)(3) allows the court to “deny any
motion that fails to meet this ...