United States District Court, D. Oregon
Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge
Rondale Mason brings this pro se action for quiet
title against Defendant Fannie Mae. Plaintiff seeks a
judgment that he is the owner in fee simple of two pieces of
real property located at 2811 SE Rosefinch Dr. Gresham,
Oregon 97080, and 6014 SW View Point Terrace, Portland,
Oregon 97239. Defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that
Plaintiff has not alleged that he has a legal or equitable
interest in either property.
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted
only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the
claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual
allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief.
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622
F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the
sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the
court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts
alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.
2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n,
629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a
presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint “may
not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must
contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give
fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
1216 (9th Cir. 2011). All reasonable inferences from the
factual allegations must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.
Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d
1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however,
credit the plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched
as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678-79 (2009).
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to
“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that
it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be
subjected to the expense of discovery and continued
litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
quiet title statute provides that “[a]ny person
claiming an interest or estate in real property not in the
actual possession of another may maintain a suit in equity
against another who claims an adverse interest or estate
therein for the purpose of determining such conflicting or
adverse claims, interests or estates.” Or. Rev. Stat
§ 105.605. Thus, in order to bring an action for quiet
title, a plaintiff must allege both that he has a legal or
equitable interest in the real property at issue, and that it
is adverse to the interest asserted by the party against whom
quiet title is sought.
case, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has a legal or
equitable interest in the real property at issue. Plaintiff
alleges that on October 3, 2017 he sent a promissory note in
the amount of $250, 000 to Defendant's agent along with a
security agreement making the following offer:
If I, Rondale Mason, do not receive your response within the
next 30 calendar days from receipt of this notice and
property is still vacant and/or abandoned, then by your
non-response and acceptance of the enclosed Promissory Note,
you acknowledge the agreement and sale of the above addressed
property to Rondale Mason via the enclosed Promissory Note. I
will then move forward in my efforts to take possession of
property located at 2811 SE Rosefinch Dr. Gresham, OR, 97080,
and a lien will be placed on the property for the enclosed
amount, and held in possession of RONDALE LA'SHAWN MASON.
at 2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's nonresponse to
the promissory note and security agreement created a binding
contract. On October 10, 2017, Plaintiff sent another
promissory note in the amount of $250, 000 to Defendant's
agent, along with a security agreement making an identical
offer with regard to the 6014 SW View Point Terrace property.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's nonresponse to the
second offer created a second binding contract.
matter of law, Plaintiff's unsolicited offers to
Defendant, and Defendant's nonresponse to those offers,
do not create binding contracts. “The mere receipt of
an unsolicited offer does not impair the offeree's
freedom of action or inaction or impose on him any duty to
speak.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69
cmt. a. (1981); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1182 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2011)
(citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and observing
that there is generally no contract where an offeror makes an
unsolicited offer to an offeree and claims that the
offeree's silence will be taken as acceptance). Because
Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which a binding contract
can reasonably be inferred, Plaintiff has not alleged that he
has a legal interest in the property to which he seeks quiet
makes no allegation that he has a legal interest in the
property from a source other than the alleged contract.
Plaintiff also makes no allegations that he has an interest
in the properties under any equitable doctrine such as, for
example, the doctrine of adverse possession. Indeed,
Plaintiff's complaint indicates that he is not currently
in possession of either property. Moreover, Plaintiff does
not allege what interest Defendant has in the real property
at issue, though in his exhibits he identifies Defendant as
the owner of record of the two properties.
Motion to Dismiss (ECF 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's
Complaint (ECF 2) is dismissed. If Plaintiff believes he can
cure the identified deficiencies, he may file an amended
complaint within 14 days of the date of this Order.