United States District Court, D. Oregon
Maricela Ramirez. Plaintiff, pro se.
K. Norton, Hart Wagner, LLP, Stephanie C Kucera, Hart Wagner,
LLP, Of Attorneys for Defendant Adventist Medical Center.
M. Keating, Kelly Frances Huedopohl, and Tamara X. Arthur,
Keating Jones Hughes, P.C., One SW Columbia, of Attorneys for
Defendants Tania Shaw, MD, and Krista Swaninger, MD.
Michael T. Stone and Grant D. Stockton, Brisbee &
Stockton, LLC, of Attorneys for Defendant Providence Health
& Services - Oregon doing business as Providence St.
Vincent Medical Center.
Chelsea J. Glynn and Donald E. Templeton, Dunn Carney Allen
Higgins & Tongue, LLP. of Attorneys for Defendant Metro
West Ambulance Service, Inc.
Clinton Geil, Oregon Department of Justice, of Attorney for
Defendants State of Oregon, Oregon Department of Justice,
Oregon State Board of Nursing, Oregon Health Authority,
Suzanne Meadows, and Charla Stephenson.
OPINION AND ORDER
Michael H. Simon, District Judge.
Maricela Ramirez (“Plaintiff”), pro se,
sues Providence Health & Services- Oregon, doing business
as Providence St. Vincent Medical Center
(“Providence”), its emergency department staff,
and “Does 1-100” who Plaintiff alleges are
employees or independent contractors of
Providence. Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint
(“Complaint”) alleges that Providence committed
discrimination, conspiracy and fraudulent concealment,
medical malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Before the
Court is Providence's motion for summary judgment. For
the reasons that follow, this motion is granted.
is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks
Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257
(9th Cir. 2001). Although “[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, ” the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is]
insufficient . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
the responsibility of the non-moving party to “set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Keiffer v. Pernsteiner, 967 F.2d
527 (9th Cir. 1992). In order for a party to avoid summary
judgment, such facts must be supported by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). Where an affidavit or declaration is relied
on to oppose a summary judgment motion, it “must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Where the party
opposing summary judgment is proceeding pro se, the
court “must consider as evidence . . . all of [that
party's] contentions offered in motions and pleadings,
where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and
set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and
where [the party] attested under penalty of perjury that the
contents of the motions or pleadings are true and
correct.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923
(9th Cir. 2004).
claims arise out of a visit to Providence's emergency
department on October 8, 2015. It is undisputed that on the
evening of October 8, Plaintiff sought care at Providence and
an ER doctor removed a piece of garlic from Plaintiff's
nostril. Plaintiff also states that she suffers from what she
claims are symptoms of low blood pressure, including
lethargy, dizziness, and blackouts. Plaintiff further states
that her low blood pressure is caused by kidney failure,
liver disease, and several other medical ailments, and that
all patients with kidney failure should be transported to the
emergency department for additional assessment and treatment.
Based on these various assertions, Plaintiff alleges that
Providence, by simply removing the garlic from her nose and
discharging her without admitting her to the hospital or
providing treatment for various other medical conditions,
deliberately discriminated ...