and submitted April 13, 2016, Ridgeview High School, Redmond.
Douglas County Circuit Court 13CR0306FE; Ann Marie Simmons,
B. Crowther, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for
appellant. On the brief were Ernest G. Lannet, Chief
Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Sarah Laidlaw,
Deputy Public Defender, Offce of Public Defense Services.
D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for
respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Carson L.
Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General.
DeVore, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Judge, and Powers,
Summary: Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for
delivery of methamphetamine, ORS 475.890(2). He assigns error
to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from him, arguing that police unlawfully
extended a seizure of his person without reasonable
suspicion. He contends that an unlawful extension, together
with an unlawful seizure from him of a knife, rendered
inadmissible his subsequent disclosure of methamphetamine in
The trial court did not err. Detectives had reasonable
suspicion that defendant was involved in a drug sale and an
unlawful seizure of his knife did not invalidate his
disclosure of his possession of methamphetamine.
Or.App. 828] DEVORE, P. J.
appeals from a judgment of conviction for delivery of
methamphetamine, ORS 475.890(2). The trial court had denied
his motion to suppress evidence obtained from defendant at
the scene of a drug purchase arranged by a police informant.
Defendant assigns error to the denial of the motion, arguing
that an officer unlawfully extended a seizure of his person
without reasonable suspicion as to him. He argues that an
unlawful extension, together with an unlawful seizure from
him of a knife, rendered inadmissible his subsequent
disclosure of methamphetamine in his pocket. We conclude that
detectives had reasonable suspicion that defendant was
involved in a drug sale and that an unlawful seizure of his
knife did not invalidate his disclosure of his possession of
methamphetamine. We affirm.
reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we are bound by
the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by
evidence in the record. State v. Stevens, 311 Or.
119, 126, 806 P.2d 92 (1991). If the trial court did not make
findings on all facts and if there is evidence from which
those facts could be decided more than one way, we will
presume that the trial court found facts in a way consistent
with its ultimate conclusion. Id. at 127 (citing
Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621
February 5, 2013, detective Scriven assisted detective Hansen
in a "controlled buy-bust" that was arranged with
the help of a confidential informant. Their target was
Collier, from whom the informant had planned to buy 1.7 to
1.8 grams of methamphetamine. The detectives expected that
someone, in addition to Collier, might be present because
Collier said he would get a ride from someone to the site of
the sale. Shortly before the sale, the meeting site changed a
couple of times. The parties eventually settled on a Bi-Mart
parking lot. There, the detectives spotted a car with a woman
in the driver's seat and defendant in the front passenger
seat. They saw Collier emerge from the back seat of the car
and pace around some distance from the car, while making cell
phone calls to the informant. Hansen called Burge, a nearby
detective, to intercept Collier. Scriven and [290 Or.App.
829] Hansen approached to talk to the driver and defendant in
on his experience and training, Scriven believed it was
common for multiple people to be present at drug
transactions. He was not surprised that others accompanied
Collier, because he knew that other persons either provide
transportation or are the dealer from whom the drug seller
gets the drugs. The person delivering the drugs may not
possess the drugs. That is, the "main guy doesn't
want to just give up the drugs until he has the money so
he'll ride with [a 'middle-man'] so he
doesn't get ripped off."
absolutely "expected" that defendant was involved
in the drug transaction because he was present in the car.
Hansen suspected that defendant might be involved, as he
"It's also common for individuals to be a middle
man, what we refer to as a middle man, so a drug dealer
won't let his drugs, you know, go out of his sight so
sometimes a drug dealer will go with the person who is a
middle man, and then also people weigh their drugs in cars
and use their drugs in cars, things like that. That's why
we were interested in the vehicle."
allowed that he was not "completely sure at the time,
" but he suspected that defendant's presence meant
that Collier was a "middle-man." Explaining that
the volume of methamphetamine had something to do with it,
Hansen later testified:
"A. Well, obviously, drugs are expensive and we were
buying 1.8 grams, so that's a good amount of money, so
what the drug dealer, depending on their trust basis, the
drug dealer will sometimes let their drugs walk but
"Q. When you say 'walk, ' what do you mean?
"A. Like they'll give them to somebody to take it to
whoever else and then they expect that person to bring ...