United States District Court, D. Oregon, Eugene Division
OPINION AND ORDER
Aiken U.S. District Judge.
Sharon K. Nettleton challenges the foreclosure of real
property located at 60076 Turquoise Road in Bend, Oregon. The
Deschutes County Circuit Court's entered a general
judgment of foreclosure with an effective date of October 8,
2014. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the
foreclosure judgment and the Oregon Supreme Court denied
review. A sheriffs sale is scheduled for March 28, 2018.
me is plaintiffs petition for writ of mandamus and request
for emergency stay. Plaintiff seeks (1) an emergency stay of
the sheriffs sale and (2) an order directing the Deschutes
County Circuit Court to vacate its judgment of foreclosure.
Plaintiff argues that the foreclosing lender failed to
produce sufficient proof that it had standing to foreclose,
and that the Deschutes County Circuit Court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to enter judgment. Plaintiff further contends
that the six judges named as defendants in this action
conspired to deny her due process, in violation of the United
case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Russo. Judge Russo
construed the request for an emergency stay as a motion for a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and referred the matter to me.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion for a TRO is
denied and this action is dismissed for lack of subject
same general legal standards govern temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65; New
Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S.
1345, 1347 n.2 (1977). A plaintiff seeking such relief must
establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the her favor;
and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.
Winter v. Nat'l Resources Def. Council, 555 U.S.
7, 20 (2008).
bound to deny plaintiffs request for a TRO because she cannot
show that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her
petition. Plaintiff asks this Court to issue an order
"requiring the [Deschutes County Circuit] Court to
vacate the void general judgment of foreclosure and all
supplemental judgements rendered without jurisdiction to do
so." Verified Pet. Writ Mandamus & Emergency Stay
13. That relief would "eviscerate the state court's
judgment, " in violation of the Rooker-Feldman
is a powerful doctrine that prevents federal courts from
second-guessing state court decisions by barring the lower
federal courts from hearing de facto appeals from state-court
judgments: If claims raised in the federal action are
'inextricably intertwined' with the state court's
decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims
would undercut the state ruling or require the district court
to interpret the application of state laws or procedural
rules, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction,
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir.
2003). "Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks
to disrupt or undo a prior state-court judgment, regardless
of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the
federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to
litigate her claims." Id. at 901 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Put simply, this Court lacks
authority to give plaintiff the relief she seeks. If
plaintiff wants to mount a federal-court challenge to the
state courts' foreclosure judgment, she must do so by
petitioning the United States Supreme Court. See 28
U.S.C, § 1257 (authorizing United States Supreme Court
review of final judgments or decrees rendered by "the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be
federal court "ha[s] an ongoing obligation to be sure
that jurisdiction exists, " Matheson
v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d
1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003), and must dismiss an
action if "the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, " Chapman v. Pier
1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3)). Because it is apparent from
the face of the complaint that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim, I not only deny
the request for a TRO but also dismiss the action.
reasons set forth above, plaintiffs emergency request for a
stay (doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED.