Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

A.F. v. Starbucks Corp.

United States District Court, D. Oregon

March 5, 2018

A.F., by and through his parent and guardian, FABRIZIO FEOLA, Plaintiff,
v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, Defendant.

          A.F., by and through his parent and guardian, Fabrizio Feola. Plaintiff, pro se.

          Anne Devlan Foster and Samuel T. Smith, Dunn Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue, LLP, Of Attorneys for Defendant.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          Michael H. Simon United States District Judge.

         Plaintiff A.F., a minor child, sues Defendant Starbucks Corporation through his father, Fabrizio Feola, for discrimination on the basis of a disability. Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss (ECF 9). For the reasons discussed, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

         BACKGROUND

         For purposes of this motion, the Court takes as true the following facts alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff suffers from autism. On or about April 2, 2016, Plaintiff entered a coffee shop owned by Defendant. Plaintiff became frustrated with a long wait, and began “touching” the window. A Starbucks employee immediately yelled at Plaintiff, telling him to get out and never return. Plaintiff's behavior worsened immediately following this incident. Plaintiff was visibly upset by the incident for about a week, and showed increasing signs of aggression. On April 12, 2016, Plaintiff's parents sought medical treatment for Plaintiff, and “experts” determined that Plaintiff's worsening behavior had been triggered by the incident at Starbucks. Plaintiff and his family have emotionally suffered as a result of this incident.

         On August 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Oregon state court, which Defendant timely removed. In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged only a claim for discrimination in a place of public accommodation under Oregon Revised Statutes (“ORS”) § 659A.400. ORS 659A.400 defines “place of public accommodation” under Oregon law. Liberally construing Plaintiff's pro se complaint, Plaintiff appears to assert claims under both ORS § 659A.142(4) and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12182. These statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of a disability in a place of public accommodation.

         On October 23, 2017, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff requested, and the Court granted, several extensions of the deadline to file a response to Defendant's motion. After extending the deadline for Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion through February 8, 2018, the Court directed that no further extension would be granted without good cause. Plaintiff still has not responded to Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court now evaluates Defendant's motion on its merits without the benefit of Plaintiff's response.

         DISCUSSION

         Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred, that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief, and that Plaintiff's ADA claim must be dismissed because he seeks an invalid form of relief and has no standing to bring his claim.

         The Court concludes that Plaintiff's claim is timely, but that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

         A. Statute of Limitations

         Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. Defendant has not specifically cited to a statute of limitations for a claim of discrimination arising under ORS § 659A.142. Defendant states that “claims for disability discrimination in public accommodations must be brought within one year of the occurrence of the allegedly unlawful practice.” Defendant cites ORS § 659A.875(4), which provides a one-year statute of limitations specifically for claims arising under ORS § 659A.403 or ORS § 659A.406. ORS § 659A.403 prohibits discrimination, and ORS § 659A.406 prohibits the aiding and abetting of discrimination, in a place of public accommodation on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age, ” but not disability. ORS § 659A.142(4) prohibits discrimination in a place of public accommodation based on disability, which is the foundation of Plaintiff's claim. ORS § 659A.142 does not prescribe a statute of limitations.

         Defendant directs the Court to Clink v. Oregon Health and Sciences University, 9 F.Supp.3d 1162 (D. Or. 2014), a prior decision of this Court. Defendant states that Clink applied the one-year statute of limitations in ORS § 659A.875 to claims alleging violations of ORS § 659A.142. Defendants, however, misconstrue Clink. The plaintiff in Clink did not allege violations of ORS § 659A.142. Rather, in Clink, a former employee sued his former employer alleging disability discrimination under, among other things, the federal Rehabilitation Act. Clink, 9 F.Supp.3d at 1166-68. The Rehabilitation Act did not prescribe a statute of limitations, but this Court noted that “the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.” Clink, 9 F.Supp.3d at 1166. This Court in Clink determined that the most analogous state law was Oregon's Rehabilitation Act. That Act's statute of limitations is provided in ORS § 659A.875(1), which relates specifically to unlawful employment practices. Thus, contrary to Defendant's statement, Clink did not apply ORS 659A.875, writ large, to ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.