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Parnell v. Ives

United States District Court, D. Oregon

March 2, 2018

PAUL EDWARD PARNELL, Petitioner,
v.
RICHARD IVES, Respondent.

          Paul Edward Parnell Petitioner, Pro Se

          Billy J. Williams United States Attorney

          Jared Hager, Assistant United States Attorneys for Respondent

          OPINION AND ORDER

          Marco A. Hernandez United States District Judge

         Petitioner brings this habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the denial of his bail request as well as the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP's") computation of his federal sentence. For the reasons that follow, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#5) is denied.

         BACKGROUND

         Petitioner is an inmate at FCI-Sheridan serving a 72-month federal sentence. He was initially arrested in Texas on January 3, 2013 for Possession of a Controlled Substance. That case was ultimately dismissed on March 25, 2013. Due to an outstanding warrant from California for Possession of Stolen Property, authorities continued to hold Petitioner in custody and transferred him to California law enforcement personnel on April 9, 2013. On July 30, 2013, a California state court sentenced him to 44 months on the stolen property charge.

         California authorities released Petitioner from his 44-month sentence on October 16, 2013, at which time he began to serve his 72-month federal sentence. Petitioner alleges that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") refuses to provide him credit for the time he served in state custody in California between January 3, 2013 and July 30, 2013. He also asserts that he was held without bail in violation of his right to due process of law.

         Respondent asks the Court to deny relief on the Amended Petition because: (1) Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) the bail challenge is now moot; and (3) Petitioner's time in custody in California during 2013 was credited against his state-law sentence and therefore cannot be credited toward his federal sentence. Although Petitioner's supporting memorandum was due on February 5, 2018, Petitioner has not filed his memorandum nor has he communicated with the Court since consenting to U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction on November 28, 2017.

         DISCUSSION

         I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

         "In order to seek habeas relief under section 2241 ... a petitioner must first, 'as a prudential matter, ' exhaust his or her available administrative remedies." Singh v. Napolitano, 649 F.3d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Requiring a petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies aids "judicial review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum." Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). Use of available administrative remedies conserves "the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level." Id. Moreover, it allows "the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings." Id; United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agric. Employ. Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) .

         "Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the remedies are inadequate, inefficacious, or futile, where pursuit of them would irreparably injure the plaintiff, or where the administrative proceedings themselves are void." United Farm Workers, 669 F.2d at 1253 (citation omitted); see also Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (exhaustion waived where request for administrative remedy initially denied by Community Corrections Office based upon official B.O.P. policy and further appeal would almost certainly have been denied based upon the same policy). Courts should not, however, relax the exhaustion requirement where it "would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme." Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) .

         The BOP employs a multi-tiered administrative remedy program. An inmate first must attempt to resolve his issue informally through a BP-8. If he is unable to effectively resolve the issue, he may proceed to escalate his appeals in the following order: (1) the Warden of his prison (BP-9); (2) the Regional Director of the BOP (BP-10); and (3) the General Counsel in the BOP's Central Office (BP-11). Declaration of Jennifer Vickers (#10), ...


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