United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
NATACHE D. RINEGARD-GUIRMA, Plaintiff,
ALL PERSONS UNKNOWN OF THE GSAMP TRUST 2006 HE5 TRUST, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL W. MOSMAN Chief United States District Judge
matter comes before me on Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion to
Dismiss  and Request for Judicial Notice . For the
reasons below, I GRANT U.S. Bank's Motions.
2011, U.S. Bank, as successor in interest and Trustee of the
GSAMP Trust, filed a state court foreclosure action against
Ms. Rinegard-Guirma, based on her failure to make payments on
a Promissory Note. Request for Judicial Notice , Exh. 7.
U.S. Bank prevailed in 2013 and received a general judgment
of foreclosure against a property located at 5731 NE 10th
Avenue in Portland from the state court. Request for Judicial
Notice , Exh. 7.
2010, Ms. Rinegard-Guirma has filed numerous lawsuits related
to the foreclosure. These lawsuits eventually led this Court
to issue a pre-file review order. In February 2017, she
attempted to file a suit against “All Persons unknown
of the GSAMP Trust 2006 HES Trust” (No. 17-075) and
sought modification of the pre-file review order that was in
place at the time. I held a hearing on February 28, 2017, in
which I lifted the pre-file review order but warned Ms.
Rinegard-Guirma that I would issue a new pre-file review
order if her latest complaint was dismissed for the same
reasons that her previous complaints were dismissed. Civ. No.
17-075 . She filed the Complaint in this case on March 1
. I issued a new Pre-File Review Order on March 8 but did
not dismiss her Complaint at that time. Dkt. 17-075 . I
then granted leave for Ms. Rinegard-Guirma to file a First,
and then a Second, Amended Complaint; the Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) is the operative complaint in this case.
Rinegard-Guirma alleges three claims for relief in the SAC
: (1) Claim One alleges that the Oregon precedent that
establishes that a deed of trust always follows the note it
secures is preempted by federal law; (2) Claim Two alleges
this precedent violates her due process and equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) Claim Three
alleges that her Deed of Trust for her original loan is an
unenforceable contract and a legal nullity under U.S. Supreme
Court case law. SAC  at 3-5.
Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss  and a Request for
Judicial Notice . U.S. Bank moves to dismiss Ms.
Rinegard-Guirma's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(1), based on res judicata and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. Po. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Motion 
at 2. Ms. Rinegard-Guirma filed two responses, in which she
argued that U.S. Bank is not the proper defendant in this
case and opposed U.S. Bank's Motion. [42, 45].
reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept
all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072
(9th Cir. 2005). A court need not accept legal conclusions as
true because “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading
that offers only “labels and conclusions” or
“‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement'” will not
suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555, 557). While a plaintiff does not need to make detailed
factual allegations at the pleading stage, the allegations
must be sufficiently specific to give the defendant
“fair notice” of the claim and the grounds on
which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
provides that a court should freely give leave to amend a
complaint “when justice so requires.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). As such, when a court dismisses a
complaint for failure to state a claim, “leave to amend
should be granted ‘unless the court determines that the
allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.'”
DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655,
658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.
Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.
1986)). If amendment would be futile, the court need not
grant leave to amend. Id. “Leave to amend may
also be denied for repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendment.” Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem.
Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008).
Whether U.S. Bank is a Proper Defendant
preliminary matter, Ms. Rinegard-Guirma argues that U.S. Bank
is not “All Persons unknown of the GSAMP Trust 2006 HES
Trust, ” based on a document that appears to come from
a U.S. Bank website stating that “U.S. Bank as Trustee
. . .does not manage or maintain properties in
foreclosure.” Response  at 4; id. at Ex.
1. U.S. Bank entered this case as the Defendant, because it
is the Trustee of the GSAMP Trust. Under Oregon law, a
Trustee can address claims against the trust and take other
actions on behalf of a trust. O.R.S. § 130.725(14). And
the document Ms. Rinegard-Guirma attaches to her pleadings is
unauthenticated and does not speak to the issue at hand,
which is whether U.S. Bank is the Trustee of the GSAMP Trust.
I agree with U.S. Bank and conclude it is a proper defendant
The Rooker-F ...