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State v. Folks

Court of Appeals of Oregon

February 7, 2018

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN PAUL FOLKS, Defendant-Appellant.

          Argued and submitted September 26, 2017

         Lane County Circuit Court 201424377 Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Judge.

          Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Offce of Public Defense Services.

          Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F . Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

          Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and James, Judge.

         Case Summary:

         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for murder, raising two assignments of error. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant's "drug-induced psychosis" was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300. Defendant also argues that the court erred in requiring defendant to pay extradition costs because there was no evidence in the record that he is or may be able to pay them.

         Held:

         The trial court did not err in instructing the jury that defendant's transitory, drug-induced psychosis was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300. The court, however, erred in requiring defendant to pay $3, 627.30 in extradition costs because there was no evidence in the record that he is or may be able to pay them.

         Portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay extradition costs reversed; otherwise affirmed.

         [290 Or. 95] DeVORE, J.

         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for murder, raising two assignments of error. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant's drug-induced psychosis was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300.[1] Defendant also argues that the court erred in requiring defendant to pay $3, 627.30 in extradition costs. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that defendant's transitory, drug-induced psychosis was not a "mental disease or defect" under ORS 161.295 and ORS 161.300.[2] We do agree, however, that, absent a finding of an ability to pay, the court erred in ordering defendant to pay $3, 627.30 in extradition costs. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment requiring defendant to pay extradition costs, and otherwise affirm.

         TRIAL

         Defendant and his girlfriend, Perry, had come to Oregon from Mississippi. They lived in a motel room while here for seasonal construction employment. During their time in Oregon, defendant and Perry used methamphet-amine and marijuana frequently.

         The events leading to Perry's death were recounted by defendant at trial and in a recorded statement that he gave to a detective and that was played to the jury. Around 4:00 a.m. on November 23, 2014, Perry returned to the motel room after an evening out with friends. She and defendant used methamphetamine and marijuana and engaged in sexual activity. During intercourse, defendant perceived Perry's face to change, looking "evil." He believed that she was a "demon." When his leg and hip began to hurt, they stopped having sex. Defendant believed that she was responsible [290 Or. 96] for his hip pain. He made a phone call to his stepfather, expressing concern about his relationship with God and his relationship with Perry. He hung up and told Perry that he "was a child of God" and that he did not fear her and that she should not fear him. Defendant perceived Perry's face to turn evil again, and he said that he felt the presence of evil. A conflict ensued. As he described it,

"[s]omehow or another we started fighting. Then I got up and then we started choking each other. And then every time that I would call out to God to give me the strength to kill her, she got weaker, and I got stronger. And then every time like I would doubt myself that God wasn't there for me, she would overcome me, but I killed her. Okay? And I just felt, I don't know, like it was the right thing to do."

         Immediately after killing Perry, defendant drove to Mississippi. During the drive, defendant claimed that he heard Perry's voice through the radio, and he thought that the radio stations were talking to him. Days later, defendant confessed the murder to detectives and was arrested. The state charged defendant with murder, ORS 163.115, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894.

         Two experts testified at trial, and their diagnoses were generally in agreement. At defendant's behest, Jerry Larsen, a psychiatrist, had examined defendant and diagnosed him with cannabis abuse, amphetamine dependence, and "probable amphetamine-induced psychotic disorder with delusions and hallucinations" at the time of the killing. He explained that a diagnosis of amphetamine-induced psychosis, also referred to as drug-induced psychosis, is made, in part, by "the presence of hallucinations or delusions" that the individual believes to be real. Larsen contrasted that diagnosis with a diagnosis of drug dependence, which is characterized by physical or emotional withdrawal symptoms. He said that the "difficulty with [a drug-induced psychosis] is that the symptoms look like schizophrenia. The difference is that schizophrenic illnesses are lifelong, they don't get better but they can be controlled. A drug-induced psychosis clears after a period of time." Larsen testified that defendant was not exhibiting signs of psychosis or mental disorder at the time that Larsen evaluated him.

         [290 Or. 97] Larsen's examination revealed that, in 2009 and 2010 when defendant was not incarcerated, he used methamphetamine daily, and, by 2014, he had "doubled his intake of methamphetamine." Defendant told Larsen that he had been using a quarter to half a gram of methamphetamine every day in Oregon. In the 12 hours leading up to Perry's death, he consumed a gram of methamphetamine-a "high dose." Larsen concluded that defendant's drug-induced psychosis was caused by his long-term methamphetamine use.

         Eric Johnson, a clinical psychologist hired by the state, had also evaluated defendant and agreed with Larsen's conclusions. Johnson considered that defendant had a history of chronic substance abuse with an early onset. Defendant told Johnson that he had not slept for over a week prior to the killing, that he had been using methamphetamine continuously during that time, and that he was using "a lot of meth immediately leading up to her death."

         Johnson addressed whether defendant exhibited any signs of an underlying mental disorder or continuing psychosis independent of the use of drugs. He explained that, as defendant drove back to Mississippi, the psychotic effects that he was originally experiencing, such as voices speaking to him from the radio, dissipated as the "meth was beginning to wear off and the further he got, " which was "[c]onsistent with methamphetamine withdrawal." To determine whether there was "evidence of ongoing mental or emotional problems, " Johnson reviewed records of defendant's medical history as well as mental health records from the jail after defendant was taken into custody. Johnson said that those mental health records were "unremarkable."[3]Johnson concluded from his evaluation that defendant was suffering from "a methamphetamine-induced psychotic disorder based upon his voluntary use of that drug." Johnson elaborated, testifying that defendant was delusional and hallucinating at the time of the killing but that there was [290 Or. 98] "no evidence" of "any lingering psychosis" or long-term mental disorder.

         Later in his testimony, Johnson said that, with a drug-induced psychosis, it is theoretically possible that "some people who will experience some type of psychotic phenomenon that doesn't appear to fully resolve" and "can last a long time." But Johnson clarified that he and Larsen both concluded that, in this case, there was "no evidence whatsoever" that defendant had an "actual defect of the brain" from long-term drug use and that defendant did not "exhibit any evidence of any mental disorder other than that which was induced by his voluntary intoxication by methamphetamine." Johnson agreed that drug-induced psychosis is a "transient disorder." The psychosis "[s] tarts and stops when you use [the drug], " and, "when you remove the agent, the drug, the psychosis is no longer there." He concluded that "there's no evidence * * * to indicate that [defendant] has a psychotic disorder outside of his use of methamphetamine."[4]

         Defendant tried his case on the theory that he did not act with the requisite culpable mental state. He argued that he lacked the ability to act intentionally based in part on mental disease or defect under ORS 161.300. He also asserted the affirmative defense of insanity under ORS 161.295. Among others, the trial court gave jury instructions for voluntary intoxication under ORS 161.125, diminished capacity under ORS 161.300, and guilty except for insanity under ORS 161.295. Over defendant's objections, however, the trial court instructed the jury that "[d]rug use, drug dependence, and ...


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