United States District Court, D. Oregon, Medford Division
OPINION & ORDER
MICHAEL McSHANE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Partial
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6. The Court has determined that
this motion is appropriate for resolution without oral
argument. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Ryan Hemming was employed by Defendant Decibels of Oregon,
Inc. as a Senior Technician from September or October 2009
through May 22, 2016. Plaintiff alleges he was subjected an
unfair and unlawful system of payment while employed by
Defendants, which deprived him of wages for time spent
working and overtime pay to which he was entitled. Plaintiff
alleges that other installation technicians employed by
Defendants were subjected to the same unlawful system and
seeks to bring a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq.
Two
other installation technicians, Matthew Wilson and Daniel
Wilson, have brought substantially similar actions in
Matthew Wilson v. Decibels of Oregon, Inc. et al.,
1:16-cv-00855-CL (“Matthew Wilson”),
filed May 16, 2016, and Daniel Wilson v. Decibels of
Oregon, Inc. et al., 1:17-cv-01558-MC (“Daniel
Wilson”), filed October 2, 2017. Daniel Wilson,
Matthew Wilson, and Plaintiff are all represented by the same
counsel and all three cases include a claim for collective
action against Defendants under the FLSA.
A
number of installation technicians, including Plaintiff and
Daniel Wilson, sought to join the earliest filed case,
Matthew Wilson, as part of the collective action
certification process. On July 12, 2017, Magistrate Judge
Clarke issued a Report and Recommendation, in which he
declined to certify the collective action because the record
did not support a finding that the installation technicians
were “similarly situated” for purposes of the
FLSA. Livett Decl. Ex. D, at 6-9.[1] This Court adopted Judge
Clarke's Report and Recommendation on August 31, 2017,
and conditional certification was denied. Livett Decl. Ex. D,
at 14-16. This action and the Daniel Wilson case
were filed shortly after the Court's conditional
certification decision and the Matthew Wilson
plaintiff's individual claims remain pending before Judge
Clarke.
LEGAL
STANDARD
To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual material, accepted as true, to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 569 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement' but asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept as
true the allegations in the complaint and construe them in
favor of the plaintiff, but the court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Id.
The
pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,
' but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Id. A complaint also does not suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further
factual enhancement.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Defendants
argue (1) that Plaintiff's claim for collective action is
barred by collateral estoppel based on the Court's ruling
in Matthew Wilson and (2) that Plaintiff's FLSA
and state law claims are at least partially time-barred.
I.
Collateral Estoppel
Defendants
argue Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting a
claim for collective action under the FLSA based on the
Court's prior decision denying conditional certification
in Matthew Wilson. Defendants contend Plaintiff is
bound by the Matthew Wilson decision because he
affirmatively “opted-in” as a plaintiff to the
collective action claim in that case prior to the denial of
certification and is therefore barred from bringing a
collective action claim in a subsequent action.
Collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, “generally refers to the
effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive
litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and
resolved in a valid court determination essential to the
prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same
or a different claim.” New Hampshire v. Maine,
532 U.S. 742, 748-49 (2001). Collateral estoppel applies
where it is established that “(1) the issue necessarily
decided at the previous proceedings is identical to the one
which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding
ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or
in privity with a party in the first proceeding.”
Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 885
(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
A.
Identity of Parties
Defendants
argue that, by affirmatively opting in to the Matthew
Wilson collective action claim, Plaintiff became a party
to that action and is therefore bound by the preclusive
effect of the Court's unfavorable decision. Plaintiff
contends he was not a “party” in Matthew
Wilson because the Court ultimately declined to certify
collective action in that case.
To
support his position, Plaintiff relies on the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564
U.S. 299 (2011). In Smith, the Supreme Court held
that, in the context of a class action under Rule 23, an
unnamed member of a proposed but uncertified class was not a
“party” to earlier class litigation and was not
bound under principles of nonparty preclusion. Id.
at 312-18. Collective actions under the FLSA are
distinguishable from class actions under Rule 23, however.
Unlike a Rule 23 action, an employee becomes a party
plaintiff in an FLSA case when he consents in writing and the
consent is filed in the court in which the suit is brought.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 256. A plaintiff
who validly consents to “opt-in” to a collective
action claim is bound by the court's judgment.
Id.; see also McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat.
Ass'n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]hose plaintiffs who expressly join the collective
action are bound by its results.”).
In
Phillips v. Randy's Trucking, Inc.,
1:16-cv-00753-LJO-JLT, 2016 WL 6248264 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
2016), the district court rejected a similar attempt to apply
Smith to FLSA opt-in parties. As in the present
case, the Phillips plaintiff had affirmatively opted
in to a prior collective action class before the court denied
conditional certification. Id. at *1. The plaintiff
argued that, following Smith, he was not a party to
the prior action. The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument, finding that “Smith is inapplicable
here, because that holding applies to putative plaintiffs in
the Rule 23 context who do not affirmatively opt in to the
suit, and are therefore not considered part of the class
until class certification is granted.” Id., at
*4 n.2.
Given
the strong factual similarity between Phillips and
the present case, the Court finds the reasoning of
Phillips to be especially persuasive. Plaintiff
affirmatively opted in to the collective action claim in
Matthew Wilson before the Court denied conditional
certification. In doing so, Plaintiff agreed to be bound by
the Court's decision. See Livett Decl. Ex. B, at
19.[2]The Court therefore ...