In the Matter of B. A. F., a Person Alleged to have a Mental Illness.
v.
B. A. F., Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent,
Argued
and submitted November 7, 2017
Multnomah
County Circuit Court 16CC04564 Connie L. Isgro, Judge pro
tempore.
Joseph
DeBin argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs
was Multnomah Defenders, Inc.
Robert
M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for
respondent. With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before
DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Aoyagi,
Judge.
Case
Summary:
Appellant
in this civil commitment case appeals a judgment committing
him to the jurisdiction of the Mental Health Division for a
period not to exceed 180 days. On appeal, appellant asserts
that the trial court plainly erred by failing to advise him
of possible outcomes of the proceedings as required by ORS
426.100(1). The state contends that, because appellant's
180-day commitment period has expired, the appeal should be
dismissed as moot. The state also argues that, in any event,
the trial court did not err when advising appellant of the
possible results of the commitment hearing. Held:
The Court of Appeals adheres to its line of cases holding
that, in light of the social stigma attendant to involuntary
commitment, an appeal from a commitment judgment is not
rendered moot by the expiration of the commitment period and,
accordingly, concludes that the appeal is not moot.
Furthermore, under State v. M. M., 288 Or.App. 111,
405 P.3d 192 (2017), the trial court plainly erred in failing
to advise appellant of all of the possible results of the
commitment proceedings.
Reversed.
[290 Or. 2]
EGAN,
C. JUDGE.
Appellant
in this civil commitment case appeals a judgment committing
him to the jurisdiction of the Mental Health Division for a
period not to exceed 180 days. See ORS 426.130. On
appeal, he asserts that the trial court plainly erred by
failing to advise him of possible outcomes of the proceedings
as required by ORS 426.100(1).[1] In response, the state asserts
that, because appellant's 180-day commitment period has
expired, we should dismiss the appeal as moot. In the
alternative, the state contends that, in any event, the trial
court did not err when advising appellant of the possible
results of the commitment hearing. As explained below, we
reject the state's contention that the appeal is moot.
Furthermore, in light of our recent decision in State v.
M. M.. 288 Or.App. 111, 405 P.3d 192 (2017), we agree
with appellant that the trial court plainly erred in failing
to advise him of all of the possible results of the
proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse.
We
begin by addressing the issue of mootness. As noted, the
state asserts that the case is moot because the 180-day
commitment period has expired. According to the state, there
are not sufficient collateral consequences such that
resolution of the issues will have a practical effect on
appellant's rights. Appellant responds that the long-term
consequences of commitment are significant. Among other
things, appellant points to the social stigma associated with
civil commitment in support of his view that his appeal is
not moot.
As the
state acknowledges, contrary to its assertion that this case
is moot, in State v. Van Tassel, 5 Or.App. 376, 385,
484 P.2d 1117 (1971), we held that an appeal from a civil
commitment order does not become moot after the expiration of
the commitment period. Specifically, we explained that
involuntary commitment as a result of mental illness carries
with it significant social stigma and that stigma constitutes
a deleterious collateral consequence. In the state's [290
Or. 3] view, however, we should overrule our holding in
Van Tassel. In support of its position, the state
points out that, by statute, records of civil commitments are
confidential. See ORS 426.160. Furthermore, the
state contends that there is "good reason to question
whether the reasoning in Van Tassel regarding the
social effect of an involuntary commitment remains intact in
light of changing societal attitudes toward mental illness
and its treatment."
As we
have explained, we will overrule a case only when it is
"plainly wrong, a rigorous standard grounded in
presumptive fidelity to stare decisis." State v.
Civil. 283 Or.App. 395, 406, 388 P.3d 1185 (2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see State v.
Ortega-Gonsalez, 287 Or.App. 526, 540 n 5, 404 P.3d 1081
(2017) ("[T]he party seeking to change a precedent must
affirmatively persuade us that it is clearly wrong").
We
begin by observing that, although Van Tassel was
decided in 1971, we have more recently reaffirmed its
reasoning that the stigma attendant to involuntary civil
commitment is an important collateral consequence. In 2002,
we held that, in light of the stigma attendant to a civil
commitment, an appeal from an order continuing commitment,
like an ...