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Oien v. State, Department of Corrections

United States District Court, D. Oregon

January 22, 2018

IOAN PAUL OIEN, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF OREGON; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; TWO RIVERS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; CORPORAL DAVIS, Defendants.

          Ioan Paul Oien Plaintiff Pro Se

          Ellen F. Rosenblum Attorney General, Shannon M. Vincent Attorneys for Defendants

          OPINION & ORDER

          Marco A.Hernarldez United States District Judge

         Plaintiff Ioan Paul Oien, an inmate at the Two Rivers Correctional Institution (TRCI), brings this action against the State of Oregon, the State's Department of Corrections, TRCI, and Corporal Davis, contending that Davis sexually assaulted Plaintiff during an unclothed strip search and that Plaintiff has been retaliated against for filing this lawsuit. Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that all Defendants except for Davis are not proper Defendants in this action. Because I agree with Defendants on both issues, I grant Defendants' motion.

         BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff entered the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) on February 16, 2017, moving to TRCI on March 15, 2017. Arnell Eynon Decl. ¶¶ 4, 19, ECF 19. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that on April 20, 2017, after a visit at TRCI from his grandmother Cathy Nelson, Davis strip searched him inside the bathroom for no reason and while doing so and after putting on latex gloves, stuck his finger in Plaintiff's "bottom." Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that he contacted Behavioral Health Services, but they did not help him. Id. He asked to talk to a counselor and as of the filing of the Amended Complaint on August 28, 2017, "it has still not happened." Id. Plaintiff alleges he was told, however, that Davis was going to get terminated from his job because of his unprofessional conduct and that the officers in charge would insure that Davis stayed away from Plaintiff. Id. Despite this assurance, Plaintiff alleges that Davis did not get terminated and still works at TRCI as a corrections officer. Id.

         Plaintiff contends that although he was told a detective would talk to him "right away, " it took five months for that to occur. Id. Then, Plaintiff asserts, when the detective came, he treated Plaintiff "very badly, " threatened him, and told the officers in charge to retaliate against him. Id. According to Plaintiff, he has been retaliated against and threatened. Id. In one alleged incident, officers placed him back in his cell with a cellmate after the cellmate assaulted him and in contravention of his need for a single cell. Id. Moreover, "TRCI" moved Plaintiff to a different unit for no reason in retaliation for filing the lawsuit. Id. As a result of the move, he lost his prison job. Id.

         Other than these allegations in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff submits a Declaration in which he states that Davis performed an unclothed search on Plaintiff on August 20, 2017[1] and "stuck his finger up inside my bottom." Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 8, ECF 25. The Declaration does not address any of the alleged retaliation facts.

         Based on his allegations, Plaintiff contends that Davis violated his Eighth Amendment rights and that "Defendants, TRCI, Corporal Davis, and DOC" have retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as noneconmic and punitive damages. Id.

         STANDARDS

         Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of "'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, ' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

         Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

         The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Suever v. Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). The court draws inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).

         If the factual context makes the nonmoving party's claim as to the existence of a material issue of fact implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support his claim than would otherwise be necessary. Mats ...


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