United States District Court, D. Oregon
Maricela Ramirez. Plaintiff, pro se.
Rodney
K. Norton, Hart Wagner, LLP, 1000 SW Broadway, Portland, OR
97205. Stephanie C Kucera, Hart Wagner, LLP, 439 SW Umatilla
Avenue, Redmond, OR 97756. Of Attorneys for Defendant
Adventist Medical Center.
Robert
M. Keating, Kelly Frances Huedopohl, and Tamara X. Arthur,
Keating Jones Hughes, P.C., One SW Columbia, Suite 800,
Portland, OR 97258-2095. Of Attorneys for Defendants Tania
Shaw, MD and Krista Swaninger, MD.
Melissa J. Bushnick and Grant D. Stockton, Brisbee &
Stockton LLC, 139 NE Lincoln Street, Hillsboro, OR 97123. Of
Attorneys for Defendant Providence Health & Services -
Oregon doing business as Providence St. Vincent Medical
Center.
Chelsea J. Glynn and Donald E. Templeton, Dunn Carney Allen
Higgins & Tongue, LLP, 851 SW Sixth Avenue, Suite 1500,
Portland, OR 97204-1357. Of Attorneys for Defendant Metro
West Ambulance Service, Inc.
OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL H. SIMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff
Maricela Ramirez (“Plaintiff”) brings this
pro se lawsuit against Metro West Ambulance Service,
Inc. (“Metro West”) and several other defendants,
alleging medical malpractice, discrimination, retaliation,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges in her Second
Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) the following
claims against Metro West: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981; (2) violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a); (3) violation of Oregon
Revised Statutes (“ORS”) § 659A.403; (4)
conspiracy and fraudulent concealment under 18 U.S.C. §
1512; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff alleges that Metro West paramedics discriminated
against her on the basis of race. Before the Court is Metro
West's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons
stated below, the motion is granted.
STANDARDS
A party
is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks
Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257
(9th Cir. 2001). Although “[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, ” the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is]
insufficient . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
It is
the responsibility of the non-moving party to “set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Keiffer v. Pernsteiner, 967 F.2d
527 (9th Cir. 1992). In order for a party to avoid summary
judgment, such facts must be supported by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1)(A). Where an affidavit or declaration is relied
on to oppose a summary judgment motion, it “must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Where the party
opposing summary judgment is proceeding pro se, the
court “must consider as evidence . . . all of [that
party's] contentions offered in motions and pleadings,
where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and
set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and
where [the party] attested under penalty of perjury that the
contents of the motions or pleadings are true and
correct.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923
(9th Cir. 2004).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
has not attested to the veracity of any of her contentions,
as she must in order for the court to consider those
contentions as evidence. Although Plaintiff has submitted
several exhibits, she has similarly not submitted any
declaration attesting to the truth of those exhibits.
Nonetheless, the Court will, for purposes of this motion,
presume that all of Plaintiff's exhibits has been
properly authenticated.
On
October 8, 2015, Plaintiff called 911. She was suffering from
a nose bleed due to a garlic clove lodged in her nose. ECF
109 at 4; ECF 95 at 2; ECF 96 at 2; ECF 97 at 2. Two Metro
West paramedics, Michelle Smith and Jacob Farmer, responded
to the call and arrived at Plaintiff's home. When
Plaintiff opened the door, Farmer told Plaintiff that if they
took her to the hospital in an ambulance it would be
expensive. Farmer and Smith both told Plaintiff that they had
instructed another ambulance, which had also been called to
Plaintiff's home, not to come.
Because
of the garlic clove in her nose, Plaintiff could only breathe
through her left nostril, and was able to speak but only
slowly.[1] ECF 109 at 10. Plaintiff asked that the
paramedics remove the garlic from her nose, but they did not
have the equipment or training to do so. ECF 96 at 2; ECF 97
at 2. Farmer checked Plaintiff's vitals and concluded
that they were normal. ECF 96 at 2; ECF 97 at 2. Plaintiff
alleges that her blood pressure was in fact very low, though
she does not describe how she knew this. ECF 109 at 10. Both
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