Submitted on remand February 24, 2015.
County Circuit Court C100016CR, C090068CR, C091133CR
remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, State v. Knapp, 356 Or.
574, 342 P.3d 87 (2014). Gayle Ann Nachtigal, Judge.
Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Deputy
Public Defender, Offce of Public Defense Services, fled the
briefs for appellant. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender,
Criminal Appellate Section, and Ingrid A. MacFarlane, Deputy
Public Defender, Offce of Public Defense Services, fled the
R. Kroger, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor
General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney General,
fled the answering brief for respondent. Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Rolf
C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, fled the supplemental
Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Duncan,
Judge pro tempore.
Summary: On remand from the Supreme Court, defendant renews
his argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of
the car in which he was a passenger. Held: The trial
court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress,
because defendant had a protected privacy interest in the
vehicle and its contents, the [289 Or.App. 140] search
occurred during an unlawful seizure of defendant, and the
state failed to prove that the challenged evidence inevitably
would have been discovered even without the unlawful seizure.
Or.App. 141] DUNCAN, J. PRO TEMPORE
consolidated case is before us on remand from the Supreme
Court. In our prior decision, we reversed and remanded the
trial court's judgments, holding that the trial court
erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a warrantless search of a vehicle in which
defendant had been a passenger. State v. Knapp, 253
Or.App. 151, 290 P.3d 816 (2012), vac'd and
rem'd, 356 Or. 574, 342 P.3d 87 (2014) (Knapp
I). The Supreme Court remanded the case to us to
reconsider our decision in light of, inter alia, its
opinion in State v. Unger, 356 Or. 59, 333 P.3d 1009
(2014). State v. Knapp, 356 Or. 574, 342 P.3d 87
(2014) (Knapp II). Following supplemental briefing
by the parties, we conclude that the trial court erred in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, because, contrary
to the state's arguments in the trial court and on
appeal, defendant had a protected privacy interest in the
vehicle and in its contents, the search occurred during an
unlawful seizure of defendant, and the state's argument
that the challenged evidence inevitably would have been
discovered even without the unlawful seizure is unavailing.
Therefore, we reverse and remand.
review the trial court's ruling denying defendant's
motion to suppress for legal error, in light of the evidence
that was before the trial court when it made its ruling.
State v. Quigley, 270 Or.App. 319, 320, 348 P.3d 250
(2015) (whether an officer unlawfully extended a traffic stop
and whether evidence obtained after an unlawful extension of
a traffic stop must be suppressed are questions of law,
reviewed for legal error); State v. Pitt, 352 Or.
566, 575, 293 P.3d 1002 (2012) (as a general rule, a
reviewing court evaluates a trial court's ruling on a
pretrial motion "in light of the record made before the
trial court when it issued the order, not the trial record as
it may have developed at some later point"). When doing
so, we are bound by the trial court's factual findings if
there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record
to support them. State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or.
163, 165-66, 389 P.3d 1121 (2017). If the trial court
"did not make express findings and there is evidence
from which the trial court could have found a fact in more
than one way, [289 Or.App. 142] we will presume that the
trial court decided the facts consistently with the trial
court's ultimate conclusion." Id. at 166.
Stated in accordance with those standards, the relevant facts
are as follows.
HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
10 a.m. on the day at issue, a man, Beardall, was driving a
Jeep, which he owned. Beardall was accompanied by another
man, defendant, who was riding in the front passenger seat of
the Jeep. An officer, Mace, initiated a traffic stop to
investigate Beardall, because the Jeep's brake lights
were not working, and to investigate defendant, because he
was not wearing a seatbelt. See ORS 816.320(1) (d)
(requiring brake lights); ORS 811.210(1)(a)(H) (requiring
passengers to wear seat belts). Mace obtained identification
cards from both Beardall and defendant. Defendant told Mace
that he was on parole for armed robbery. Mace took the
identification cards to his patrol car and contacted dispatch
to run a records check. Dispatch informed Mace that defendant
had "a caution for armed robbery and some other
things." Mace requested backup and, when a backup
officer arrived, Mace returned to the Jeep. Rather than
proceed with his investigation of the traffic violations,
Mace retained the identification cards and asked Beardall for
consent to search the Jeep, which Beardall gave. Mace had
Beardall and defendant step out of the car, and they were
patted down and placed by the front of a patrol car. During
the search of the car, Mace found scales with traces of
suspected methamphetamine under the front passenger seat and
a baggie of suspected methamphetamine between the front
passenger seat and the center console.
Or.App. 143] The state charged defendant with one count of
unlawful possession of methamphetamine. ORS
475.894.Defendant moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during Mace's search of the Jeep, arguing,
inter alia, that Mace had detained him in violation
of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution by
extending the traffic stop and that the challenged evidence
had to be suppressed because it was the product of that
constitutional violation. Because the parties' arguments in
the trial court and on appeal frame the question before us,
we set them out in some detail.
trial court, defendant argued that Mace violated Article I,
section 9, when he asked for consent to search, instead of
proceeding with the traffic stop investigation:
"The key issue is whether the officer's request to
search occurred during an unavoidable lull in the
investigation, or whether the officer paused his
investigation into the traffic violation in order to extend
the scope of the stop by asking [for] consent to search. When
an officer has all of the information necessary to issue a
citation but instead delays in processing it or in telling
the motorist that he or she is free to go, the stop is no
longer lawful unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of
further criminal activity.
"In this case, Officer Mace ceased his processing of the
traffic violation and went down an unrelated path that
unconstitutionally extended the length of the traffic stop.
Because Officer Mace violated *** Article I, section 9, ***
this court must suppress all ...