United States District Court, D. Oregon, Pendleton Division
WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, OREGON WILD, THE SIERRA CLUB, and GREAT OLD BROADS FOR WILDERNESS, Plaintiffs,
STACEY FORSON, in her official capacity as Ochoco National Forest Supervisor; and UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, Defendants. CENTRAL OREGON LANDWATCH, an Oregon nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff,
STACEY L. FORSON, in her official capacity as Ochoco National Forest Supervisor; JAMES M. PEÑA, in his official capacity as Regional Forester for Region 6 of the United States Forest Service; and UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, a federal agency of the United States Department of Agriculture, Defendants. OREGON HUNTERS ASSOCIATION, an Oregon nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture; and STACY FORSON, Ochoco National Forest Supervisor, in her official capacity, Defendants. and OCHOCO TRAIL RIDERS, OREGON MOTORCYCLE RIDERS ASSOCIATION, PACIFIC NORTHWEST 4 WHEEL DRIVE ASSOCIATION, DESCUTES COUNTY 4 WHEELERS, and THE BLUERIBBON COALITION, Defendant-Intervenor- Applicants.
OPINION AND ORDER
PATRICIA SULLIVAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
above-captioned, consolidated actions, plaintiffs challenge
the Ochoco Summit Trail System Project in the Ochoco National
Forest. Intervenor-applicants Ochoco Trail Riders, Oregon
Motorcycle Riders Association, Pacific Northwest 4 Wheel
Drive Association, Deschutes County 4 Wheelers, and the
BlueRibbon Coalition (“intervenor-applicants”)
move to intervene as defendant-intervenors. (Docket No. 28).
The existing parties do not oppose intervention, subject to
certain conditions. Id., at 1-2. For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS intervenor-applicants' Motion
to Intervene subject the parties' agreed conditions.
action concerns the decision of defendants Stacey Forson and
the U.S. Forest Service to approve new off-highway vehicle
trails and a 137-mile motorized trail system in the Ochoco
National Forest in Central Oregon. Am. Compl. ¶ 1
(Docket No. 24). Plaintiffs allege that the Project will
harm the Forest's wildlife, vegetative, water, and other
natural resources by allowing motorized vehicle traffic.
Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs are environmental
non-profit and community organizations. Id.
¶¶ 10-13. They seek declaratory and injunctive
relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq.; the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; Executive
Order 11644 (as amended by Executive Order 11989); Forest
Service Travel Management regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 212;
the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600
et seq.; and implementing regulations. Am. Compl.
are non-profit corporations, public benefit corporations,
and/or volunteer organizations of recreational motor vehicle
rider enthusiasts, including off-road motorcycles, Jeeps and
four-wheel drive vehicles, and all-terrain vehicles. Worley
Decl. ¶¶ 1-3 (Docket No. 28-1); Drake Decl.
¶¶ 1-3 (Docket No. 28-2); Ulrich Decl. ¶¶
1-3 (Docket No. 28-3); Amador Decl. ¶¶ 1-3 (Docket
No. 28-4). Intervenor-applicants seek to intervene to
represent their interests in access to Forest Service lands
through the Summit Trail System Project.
intervenor-applicants' certification, the existing
parties do not oppose intervention, subject to these
(1) Defendant-Intervenor-Applicants will not seek discovery
in this proceeding or introduce materials outside the
administrative record on the merits of Plaintiffs'
(2) Defendant-Intervenor-Applicants will not assert claims
against Plaintiffs or Federal Defendants in this proceeding;
(3) Defendant-Intervenor-Applicants will confine their
arguments to the issues raised in Plaintiffs' complaints
and will avoid collateral arguments; and
(4) Defendant-Intervenor-Applicants will not repeat arguments
raised by Federal Defendants.
Mot. Intervene, at 2-3 (Docket No. 28). Intervenor-applicants
agree to the conditions. Id., at 3.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2) allows intervention of right by
“anyone” who, “[o]n timely motion, ”
“claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect
its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
that interest.” This creates a four-part test for
intervention of right: (1) the applicant's motion is
timely; (2) the applicant has asserted an interest relating
to the subject property or transaction; (3) the
applicant's ability to protect that interest would,
absent intervention, be impaired by disposition of the
matter; and (4) the existing parties do not adequately
represent applicant's interests. County of Orange v.
Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986).
factor one, timeliness, “three factors are weighed: (1)
the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to
intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the
reason for and length of the delay.” Id. As to
factor two, an interest in the property or transaction, this
“is a practical, threshold inquiry.” Sw. Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th
Cir. 2001). “No specific legal or equitable interest
need be established. It is generally enough that the interest
asserted is protectable under some law, and that there is a
relationship between the legally protected interest and the
claims at issue.” Id. (alteration, quotation,
and citations omitted). “An applicant demonstrates a
‘significantly protectable interest' when the
injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs will have direct,
immediate, and harmful effects upon a third party's
legally protectable interests.” Id. (quotation
omitted). As to factor three, impairment of interest,
“‘if an absentee would be substantially affected
in a practical sense by the determination made in an action,
he should, as a general rule, be entitled to
intervene.'” Id. at 822 (alteration
omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 Advisory Comm. Notes). As
to factor four, no adequate representation of ...