Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Moradi v. ReconTrust Company, N.A.

United States District Court, D. Oregon

November 21, 2017

KAMBIZ and HOMA MORADI, husband and wife, Plaintiffs,
v.
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., et al., Defendants.

          James P. Laurick, Kilmer, Voorhees & Laurick, P.C., Of Attorneys for Defendant(s).

          Kambiz and Homa Moradi, pro se.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          MICHAEL H. SIMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiffs, Kambiz and Homa Moradi, representing themselves, alleged in their original Complaint two claims for relief against Defendants ReconTrust Company, N.A. (“ReconTrust”), Bank of America, N.A. (“BoA”), and the Bank of New York Mellon (“BYNM”) (collectively, “Defendants”), who moved to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitation. In an Opinion and Order, the Court granted Defendants' motions but gave Plaintiff leave to replead additional facts to attempt to cure the statute of limitations deficiency. On August 21, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. Defendants again move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that Plaintiffs' claims are still time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Defendants also file a request for judicial notice of several documents related to Plaintiffs' home loan. Because Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies in their original Complaint and because it is clear to the Court that these deficiencies cannot be cured by further amendment, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, and this case is dismissed with prejudice.

         STANDARDS

         A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

         A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). All reasonable inferences from the factual allegations must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).

         A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

         B. Pro Se Filings

         A court must liberally construe the filings of a pro se plaintiff and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). “‘Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.'” Garity v. APWU Nat'l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations'” but does demand “more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

         BACKGROUND

         Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the foreclosure on Plaintiffs' home. The following facts are alleged in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and contained in documents of which the Court takes judicial notice.[1]

         A. The Foreclosure on Plaintiffs' Home

         On June 19, 2007, plaintiff Homa Moradi signed a promissory note (the “Note”) and a deed of trust (the “Deed”). The Deed listed Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. dba America's Wholesale Lender (“AWL”) as the lender, Fidelity National Title as the trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as the beneficiary “solely as a nominee for Lender and ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.