United States District Court, D. Oregon, Eugene Division
S.D., and ex rel. D.D. and Next Friend of M.D Plaintiff,
CLIDE SAIKI, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Aiken United States District Judge
plaintiff, S.D., moves this Court for a preliminary
injunction against the Oregon Department of Human Services
("DHS") enjoining it from making any reductions of
in-home services funded by the agency and restoring full
benefits to any consumer whose benefits have been reduced.
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion for preliminary
injunction is DENIED and plaintiffs amended complaint is
ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice.
plaintiff S.D., proceeding in forma pauperis, brings
this action against various employees of the Oregon
Department of Human Services ("DHS"). On May 23,
2017, the Court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, with leave to
amend, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e). On June 27, 2017, the Court denied plaintiffs
motion for appointment of pro bono counsel (doc. 8) because
the underlying facts and legal issues did not appear to be
overly complex, and plaintiffs briefing demonstrated an
ability to sufficiently articulate claims pro se. On July 7,
2017, the Court granted plaintiff an extension of time to
file an amended complaint.
24, 2017, plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion (doc. 15), in
which she argued that she was unable to meet the deadline to
amend her pleadings. She also therein objected to an attached
Oregon Court of Appeals Judgement because it "did not
allow costs" and "is being used to inflict
intentional emotional harm [and] distress in retaliation for
filing this case." Pl.'s Emergency Mot. 2. On July
25, 2017, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the
Court's denial of pro bono counsel because she had
"reasonable cause to believe" defendants were
"guilty of plotting to deport her husband or her child,
" such that she needs "a preliminary
injunction/restraining order against the defendants, "
which she could not obtain "without legal
assistance." Pl's Mot. Recons. 2. In support of that
motion, plaintiff attached docket entries from this case, as
well as hundreds of pages of documents from Oregon
administrative and state court proceedings.
August 9, 2017, the Court denied plaintiffs Emergency Motion
and Motion for Reconsideration, except to the extent that the
latter sought to file the underlying documents under seal,
and allowed plaintiff one final opportunity to file a
complaint that was not precluded by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and complied with the
requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Specifically, the Court
explained that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
Rooker-Feldman to: (1) sit in direct review of a
state court; or (2) consider any claim that amounts to a
collateral attack on issues, constitutional or otherwise,
that were or could have been raised during, or are
intertwined with, a state court decision, (doc. 18).
September 8, 2017, plaintiff filed an amended class action
complaint on behalf of herself, her husband
("D.D."), and her minor child ("M.D."),
encompassing 38 pages, 166 paragraphs, and eight claims
asserted against 21 individually-named defendants (doc. 20).
In conjunction with her amended complaint, plaintiff moved
for a preliminary injunction that, among other things,
requested that the Court "enter an order halting further
reductions in in-home services by DHS and restoring full
benefits of any consumer whose benefits DHS reduced."
Pl's Mot. Preliminary Inj. 33. In seeking a preliminary
injunction, plaintiff attaches many of the same state court
documents previously submitted in regard to her Motion for
plaintiffs claims contain very few underlying factual
allegations and, as such, presumably incorporate by reference
the preceding 118 paragraphs. Importantly, plaintiff does not
delineate which of the twenty-one individually-named
defendants her claims are asserted against. For this reason
alone, plaintiff fails to satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) is wan-anted.
See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176-78 (9th
Cir. 1996) (each averment of a pleading must be simple,
concise, and direct, stating which defendant is liable for
which wrong); see also (doc. 5) (outlining the
standard for an in forma pauperis complaint to
problematic is the fact that plaintiffs amended complaint
appears to be, with certain minimal additions, a direct copy
of the dispositive pleading from C.S. et al. v. Saiki et.
al., Case No. 6:17-cv-00564-MC ("C.S. v.
Saiki"), which was drafted by an attorney and
brought on behalf of a putative class. Although plaintiff
names D.D. and S.D. in her amended complaint and seeks class
certification, she has not identified any injury outside of
that already articulated in C.S. v. Saiki (except to
the extent that she seeks to challenge state court
proceedings related to the reduction of D.D.'s benefits
and, by extension, her compensation as an in-home care
provider; however, as noted in the August 9, 2017 Order, the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these
allegations). For this additional reason, her amended
plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of D.D. or
M.D. Regarding M.D., it is well-established that "a
guardian or parent may not bring suit in federal court on
behalf of a minor without first retaining an attorney."
Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114
F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997)). Concerning both M.D. and
D.D., "[a]s a general rule, a third-party does not
having standing to bring a claim asserting a violation of
someone else's rights." Martin v. Cal. Dep't
of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, because plaintiff is not
represented and neglected to provide the Court with any basis
that would allow her to assert third-party claims, her
allegations brought on behalf of D.D. and M.D. are not
cognizable. Indeed, D.D. is over the age of eighteen and,
therefore, if he seeks redress for the injuries alleged in
plaintiffs complaint, he may proceed pro se on his own
behalf. 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also C.E. Pope Equity
Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir.
1987) ("[a]lthough a non-attorney may appear in propria
persona in his own behalf, . . [h]e has no authority to
appear as an attorney for others than himself) (citations
for Preliminary Injunction
order to succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction, a
plaintiff seeking such relief must establish (1) a likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of
equities tips in the plaintiffs favor; and (4) a preliminary
injunction is in the public interest. Winter v.
Nat'l Resources Dej Council, 555 U.S. 7, 21
(2008). A court may not enter a preliminary injunction
without first affording the adverse party notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(1)(2); People of
State of Cat ex rel. Van De Kamp v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 766 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1985).
preliminary injunction is not warranted in this case for
several reasons. First, a district court has no authority to
grant relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or
permanent injunction where it has no jurisdiction over the
parties. See Ruhr gas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 584 (1999) ("Personal jurisdiction, too, is an
essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ., .
court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to an
adjudication.") (citation and quotation omitted).
Because plaintiffs complaint has failed to survive initial
sua sponte screenings, the United States Marshal has
not yet been directed to effect service on her behalf. The