and submitted March 28, 2016
County Circuit Court 140444271; Gregory F. Silver, Judge.
J. Snyder Severe, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. With her on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannett,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Offce of Public
Yorke, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for
respondent. With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor
Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Shorr,
Summary: Defendant appeals a conviction for driving under the
influence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010. Defendant assigns
error to the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence discovered following a traffic stop for
impeding traffic under ORS 811.130. Defendant argues that the
underlying traffic stop was not supported by probable cause,
because his conduct did not violate ORS 811.130.
Held: Defendant impeded or blocked the normal and
reasonable movement of traffic by completely stopping and
blocking a lane of travel; therefore, the officer had
probable cause to stop defendant.
Or. 632] EGAN, J.
appeals a judgment of conviction for driving under the
influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010. Defendant
assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion
to suppress evidence, asserting that the underlying traffic
stop was not supported by probable cause. We conclude, as did
the trial court, that there was probable cause to stop
defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying the suppression motion, and we affirm.
relevant facts are undisputed. On April 18, 2014, around 9:40
p.m., Officer Louka was driving an unmarked police car in
downtown Portland. While headed north on Northwest Second
Avenue, a one-way street with two lanes, Louka drove up
behind defendant's car, which was completely stopped in
the right lane of traffic just before an intersection. There
was no stop sign or traffic light at the intersection, and no
pedestrians were crossing in front of defendant's car.
Defendant's vehicle did not have a turn signal or hazard
Louka could have pulled into the left lane and driven around
defendant's car, he instead pulled up behind the car and
waited for approximately five seconds. Defendant's
vehicle did not move, and, at that point, Louka's partner
sounded the air horn on the police vehicle. The officers
waited another few seconds, and because there was no movement
by defendant's vehicle, Louka activated his police
vehicle lights, got out of his vehicle, and approached
defendant at the driver's side window. Louka believed
when he got out of his car and walked toward defendant's
vehicle that defendant was impeding traffic. See ORS
asked defendant why he was stopped in the middle of the road.
Defendant replied that he "thought there was a stop sign
there." Louka observed that defendant's speech was
"unusually slow, " and that defendant had glassy,
watery, and bloodshot eyes, and appeared to be looking past
him. Based on his training and experience, Louka [287 Or.
633] believed that defendant was likely impaired by some type
car started rolling forward; Louka told him to stop and asked
for his driver's license. After that, Louka called for a
traffic unit to come to the scene to investigate defendant
for DUII. Defendant was ultimately arrested and charged with
trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his identity and
all other evidence obtained as a result of the stop,
including any statements made by him. At the hearing on the
motion, the state argued, in part, that Louka had probable
cause to stop defendant for impeding traffic in violation of
ORS 811.130. Defendant asserted that, although Louka had
"subjective probable cause" of a traffic violation,
his subjective ...