and submitted December 16, 2015
County Circuit Court 13CR1606 Richard L. Barron, Judge.
Allin, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for
appellant. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Offce of Public Defense Services.
Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General.
DeVore, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and Duncan, Judge
pro tempore. [*]
Or.App. 602] PER CURIAM
criminal case, defendant appeals the trial court's
judgment convicting her of one count of resisting arrest, ORS
162.315. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial
court's imposition of $400 in court-appointed attorney
fees. Defendant argues, and the state concedes,
that the trial court plainly erred by imposing the fees
because the record contains no information regarding whether
defendant "is or may be able to pay" the fees.
See ORS 151.505(3) (providing that a court may not
order a person to pay attorney fees unless the person
"is or may be able to pay" them); ORS 161.665(4)
(same). We agree that the trial court plainly erred.
State v. Coverstone. 260 Or.App. 714, 716, 320 P.3d
670 (2014) (holding that a trial court commits plain error by
imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the record is
silent as to the defendant's ability to pay those fees).
We exercise our discretion to correct the error because,
given defendant's circumstances and other financial
obligations, the error is grave. See, e.g., State v.
Lea. 283 [287 Or.App. 603] Or.App. 484, 485, 388 P.3d
1252 (2017) (exercising discretion to reverse erroneous
imposition of $240 in court-appointed attorney fees "in
light of defendant's family obligations and
of judgment requiring defendant to pay court-appointed
attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.
James, J., vice Flynn, J. pro tempore.
 In his opening brief, defendant
asserted that the trial court plainly erred by instructing
the jury using Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction 1227A, which
concerns the legal standard for use of force by a peace
officer, and by giving an example of conduct that would
violate that standard. See State v. Oliphant. 347
Or. 175, 194, 218 P.3d 1281 (2009) (ruling that, in cases
where a defendant has raised a defense of self-defense, a
jury instruction regarding the legal standard for use of
force by a peace officer inserts "an irrelevant
issue-the arresting officers' actual state of mind-into
the jury's deliberations concerning [the defendant's]
claim of self-defense"); see also State v.
Vanornum. 354 Or. 614, 630-31, 317 P.3d 889 (2013)
(holding that instructing a jury in violation of
Oliphant constitutes plain error). However, at oral
argument, defendant's appellate attorney candidly stated
that, as he apparently had recently discovered,
defendant's list of requested jury instructions included
UCrJI 1227A. Because defendant requested UCrJI 1227A, any
error that the trial court made by giving the instruction
constitutes "invited error" and any error the court
made in giving an example to illustrate the instruction is
not "obvious." See, e.g., Tenbusch v. Linn
County, 172 Or.App. 172, 177-78, 18 P2d4l9, rev
den, 332 Or. 305 (2001) (holding that a party's
request for a jury instruction invites error resulting from
 Defendant is an indigent single
parent. In addition to the $400 in court-appointed attorney
fees, the trial court ordered defendant to pay a $500 fine.
The judgment requires defendant to pay the fees and fine
within 30 days and provides that, if she fails to do so, an
additional $200 will be assessed. The judgment also states
that, if defendant's case is referred to a collection
agency, "a 28 percent collection referral fee will also
be added by the court without any further notice."
Defendant's lack of financial resources, her family
obligations, the fine, and the potential penalties weigh in
favor of correction of the attorney-fee error. See State
v. Housego.276 Or.App. 550, 552, 368 P.3d 62 (2016)
(concluding that ...