Submitted December 4, 2015
County Circuit Court 14VI30797; Ronald W. Stone, Judge.
Andraia L. Turudic fled the brief pro se.
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy
Solicitor General, and Keith L. Kutler, Assistant Attorney
General, fled the brief for respondent.
Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Hadlock, Chief Judge, and
Summary: Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
failure to perform the duties of a driver when property is
damaged, ORS 811.700(1)(a), which was prosecuted as a
violation. She assigns error to the trial court's denial
of her motion to dismiss the charge for insuffcient evidence.
She also assigns error to the trial court's denial of her
request to rescind, pending appeal, the suspension of her
driving privileges resulting from her conviction.
Held: The trial court did not err. A rational trier
of fact could have found that defendant violated ORS
811.700(1)(a) when she failed to give to the other driver the
required identifying information before leaving the scene of
the accident. Furthermore, defendant's second assignment
of error is moot because the suspension of defendant's
driving privileges has ended and a decision on the issue
would have no practical effect on her rights.
Or.App. 185] EGAN, J.
appeals a judgment of conviction for one count of failure to
perform the duties of a driver when property is damaged, ORS
8ll.7OO(1)(a),  a misdemeanor that the district attorney
chose to pursue as a violation. In her first assignment of error,
defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her
motion to dismiss the charge as a matter of law because there
was insufficient evidence that she failed to perform the
duties of a driver. In her second assignment of error,
defendant challenges the trial court's decision to deny
her request to rescind the suspension of her driver's
license pending this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we
review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
following a conviction of a violation, we examine the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the state to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
that the essential elements of the violation had been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence." State v.
Bainbridge, 230 Or.App. 500, 502, 216 P.3d 338 (2009)
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
material facts are not in dispute. A vehicle driven by
defendant collided with a vehicle driven by defendant's
friend in a parking lot. At the time of the accident, the two
drivers were friends and high school classmates. The [286
Or.App. 186] two drivers and their boyfriends had visited a
restaurant together and were in the process of leaving the
parking lot when they collided. The occupants of the cars
stopped and assessed the damage caused by the collision and
found that the collision had damaged the front bumper of
defendant's friend's car. The two drivers did not
exchange any identifying information at the scene of the
accident, and they left the scene to go to the same next
destination. The friend's mother contacted defendant the
following day via text message and asked defendant for her
parents' phone number and for the vehicle's insurance
information. After defendant refused to comply, the
friend's mother first threatened to call the police and
then did so. Two days later, at 10:00 a.m., a police officer
contacted defendant at her high school. The officer
"informed [defendant] of her legal obligation to provide
certain information to the owner of damaged property in a
traffic crash. I told her I had [her friend's]
information, but still needed hers. I told her I was there to
facilitate the exchange of that information." Again,
defendant refused to provide "the information, "
and the officer arrested defendant for failure to perform the
duties of a driver when property is damaged, ORS
811.700 is a Class A misdemeanor, but the prosecutor elected
to pursue the charge against defendant as a Class A
violation. Defendant was found guilty of the violation after
a trial in municipal court and she sought de novo
review in the circuit court. After denying defendant's
motion for dismissal as a matter of law for lack of evidence,
the circuit court found defendant guilty. As a result of her
conviction, defendant was fined $435 by the trial court and
her driving privileges were suspended for 90 days by the
Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) of the
Department of Transportation. The suspension began December
27, 2014. Defendant appealed. Defendant then requested that
the circuit court rescind the suspension pending this appeal.
The circuit court declined.
appeal, defendant reasserts her argument that she made to
both trial courts below that the evidence was not sufficient
to find her guilty of a violation under ORS 8ll.7OO(1)(a).
Defendant also asserts that the trial court [286 Or.App. 187]
erred by not granting her request to rescind the driver's
privilege suspension pending this appeal.
first address defendant's second assignment of error that
the circuit court abused its discretion by denying
defendant's request to rescind the suspension of her
driver's privileges pending this appeal, as authorized by
ORS 809.460. The state contends that, because
defendant's driving privileges were suspended for 90 days
beginning December 27, 2014, and the suspension has now
ended, the issue of whether the circuit court abused its
discretion is moot. We agree.
issue on appeal is moot if a reviewing court's decision
will have no practical effect on the rights of the parties.
Brumnett v. PSRB,315 Or. 402, 405-06, 848 P.2d 1194
(1993). In this case, after her driver's privileges had
been suspended for about two months, defendant requested the
trial court to rescind the remainder of her suspension
pending the outcome of this appeal. Defendant's
driver's privileges would have been restored in March
2015. Defendant makes no argument that the circuit
court's denial of her ...