United States District Court, D. Oregon
DARRELL WILLIAM PATTEN, a.k.a. DARRELL WILLIAM PATTUM, Plaintiff,
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; DR. SNYDER, sued in his official and individual capacity; and DR. PAULSON, sued in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
F. BECKERMAN United States Magistrate Judge.
Darrell William Patten (“Plaintiff”), a former
inmate in the Oregon Department of Corrections
(“ODOC”), suffered an ankle injury while playing
a pick-up basketball game at the Columbia River Correctional
Institution (“CRCI”). Unhappy with the medical
treatment he received from ODOC and its two treating
physicians (collectively, “Defendants”), Patten
filed the present action on May 20, 2014, alleging violations
of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
1, 2016, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
Plaintiff's claims, arguing, inter alia, that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing a court action to redress prison conditions or
occurrences, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Court
attempted unsuccessfully to appoint pro bono counsel
to assist Plaintiff in responding to the pending motion for
summary judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiff chose not to respond
to the motion, despite the Court providing him several months
and multiple opportunities to do so.
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 80.) The Court
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. For the reasons explained below, the Court
grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). On a motion for summary
judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of that party. Porter
v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted). The court does not assess the
credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, or determine the
truth of matters in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine
issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative
remedies prior to filing a . . . lawsuit challenging prison
conditions.” Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072,
1078 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In Albino v.
Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), the Ninth
Circuit held that the defendant bears the burden of proving
that an administrative remedy was available to the prisoner
and that he failed to exhaust such remedy, because
non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Id. at
1172. “Once the defendant has carried that burden, the
prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden
shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing
that there is something in his particular case that made the
existing and generally available administrative remedies
effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The
proper procedure for raising non-exhaustion, as clarified in
Albino, is by moving for summary judgment.
Id. at 1169-71.
argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff's claims because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as required by § 1997e(a). As
support for their argument, Defendants rely on the
declaration of Jennifer Carsner (“Carsner”),
CRCI's Executive Support and Public Information Officer
and a custodian of records for ODOC. According to Carsner,
Plaintiff could have sought administrative review of his
medical treatment issues through established grievance
procedures. (Carsner Decl. ¶ 5.) However, the
only grievance that could arguably be construed as concerning
the issues presented in this case (CRCI-2014-01-024)
(alleging that staff wrongfully took away Plaintiff's
crutches) was not fully exhausted. (See Carsner
Decl. ¶¶ 8-10, 17-19; Defs.' Mot. at 5-6,
9-10.) Thus, Defendants have met their burden of
demonstrating that an administrative remedy was available to
Plaintiff and that he failed to exhaust such remedy.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
because Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence
showing that existing and generally available administrative
remedies were effectively unavailable to him.
foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 95) is GRANTED.