United States District Court, D. Oregon, Portland Division
OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL W. MOSMAN Chief United States District Judge
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment , arguing they are
entitled to judgment in their favor because Ms.
Crabaugh's claims are untimely and because she failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies. For the reasons stated
below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment  is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
series of events underlying this case began on December 6,
2012, when Ms. Crabaugh, an inmate in the custody of the
Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”),
slipped while working in the kitchen at the Coffee Creek
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”). As a result, Ms.
Crabaugh allegedly injured her lower back, hips, sacrum, and
coccyx. Ms. Caugaugh filed three grievances with the prison
related to the incident and her ensuing injuries.
to prison regulations, Ms. Crabaugh submitted a grievance,
CCCF.2012.12.034, on December 20, 2012 (“the 2012
grievance”), where she grieved the allegedly unsafe
conditions that caused her injury. Mr. Patrick Regan, a food
services employee at CCCF, responded to the grievance on
January 19, 2013. Ms. Crabaugh did not appeal the grievance
after receiving Mr. Regan's response.
November 1, 2013, Ms. Crabaugh submitted a second grievance,
CCCF.2013.11.006 (“the 2013 grievance”), where
she grieved her alleged lack of adequate medical care.
Specifically, she grieved the denial of her request for an
MRI, which she believed would show damage from the December
6, 2012 fall and explain the pain she continued to experience
since the fall. On November 19, 2013, a nurse responded to
the grievance. Ms. Crabaugh appealed the response on December
2, 2013. The appeal was denied on December 10, 2013, because
Ms. Crabaugh failed to comply with the proper procedures for
submitting a grievance appeal. Ms. Crabaugh did not resubmit
the appeal or further proceed with the grievance in any other
3, 2015, Ms. Crabaugh submitted a third grievance,
CCCF.2015.06.003 (“the 2015 grievance”), which
CCCF received and accepted on June 4, 2015. There, Ms.
Crabaugh grieved her alleged lack of adequate medical care
since the December 6, 2012 accident. Pursuant to policy, the
grievance was initially returned to Ms. Crabaugh because she
was involved in litigation related to the December 6, 2012
accident. Ms. Crabaugh resubmitted the grievance on June 19,
2015, after she had voluntarily dismissed the pending case.
CCCF accepted the grievance, and the health services manager
responded on July 1, 2015. Ms. Crabaugh eventually filed a
first and second level appeal of the grievance, thereby
exhausting the administrative remedies associated with her
complaint in the grievance on October 19, 2015.
do not dispute that Ms. Crabaugh exhausted her administrative
remedies as they relate to the 2015 grievance.
20, 2016, Ms. Crabaugh brought a Section 1983 action against
multiple defendants who work for ODOC. The Complaint 
alleges two claims for relief grounded in violations of Ms.
Crabaugh's constitutional rights. The first claim alleges
that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Ms.
Crabaugh's medical needs when they failed to provide her
with adequate evaluation and treatment of her injuries that
resulted from her fall on December 6, 2012. Her second claim
alleges cruel and unusual punishment, as well as deliberate
indifference to her medical needs, based on Defendants'
failure to provide adequate and timely evaluation to care for
her acute and chronic pain. Defendants have moved for summary
judgment on both claims.
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). The initial burden for a motion for summary judgment
is on the moving party to identify the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once that burden is satisfied, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, through
the production of evidence listed in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1),
that there remains a “genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party may
not rely upon the pleading allegations. Brinson v. Linda
Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)). All reasonable doubts and
inferences to be drawn from the facts are to be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986).
argue they are entitled to summary judgment for several
reasons. First, they argue that Ms. Crabaugh's claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. Second, they argue that
Ms. Crabaugh failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as
to the 2012 and 2013 grievances, thereby limiting her claims
and damages to the allegations raised in the 2015 grievance.
Third, Defendants argue that the 2015 grievance applies only
to Dr. Shelton, entitling all other defendants to summary
reasons discussed below, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Ms. Crabaugh's first claim for relief because
it is untimely. As to her second claim, she exhausted her
administrative remedies as to Dr. Shelton. But all other
Defendants are entitled to ...