Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Martin v. Oregon Department of Corrections

United States District Court, D. Oregon

February 7, 2017

MICHAEL MARK MARTIN, Plaintiff,
v.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MICHAEL GOWER, JEFF PREMO, D. E. LONG, DR. DAGNER, PhD, J. LAWSON, SANDRA AGUINAGA, NANCY GREEN, CHEMEKETA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, OREGON STATE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, and JOHN & JANE DOES, Defendants.

          OPINION AND ORDER

          Honorable Paul Papak United States Magistrate Judge

         On February 9, 2015, plaintiff pro se Michael Mark Martin, an incarcerated prisoner, filed this action in forma pauperis against defendants Oregon Department of Corrections ("ODOC"), Michael Gower, Jeff Premo, D. Long, Dr. Dagner, J. Lawson, and John and Jane Does (collectively, the "original ODOC defendants"), each individual defendant purportedly in both his individual and official capacities.[1] Martin amended his complaint effective November 3, 2015. Also on November 3, 2015, I granted Martin leave to substitute Sandra Aguinaga (collectively with the original ODOC defendants, the "ODOC defendants") for fictitiously named defendant Jane Doe. On March 11, 2016, I granted Martin leave to amend his complaint a second time and to add as additional defendants Chemeketa Community College (the "College") and the College's former employee, Nancy Green (collectively, the "College defendants"), Martin amended his complaint a third time effective June 15, 2016, adding as an additional defendant the Oregon State Board of Higher Education (the "Board").

         By and through his third amended complaint, Martin alleged (i) the ODOC defendants' liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical treatment and housing conditions, (ii) all defendants' liability under Section 1983 for the violation of his right under the First Amendment to file grievances regarding the terms and conditions of his confinement, (iii) all defendants' liability under Section 1983 for the violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, (iv) all defendants' liability under Title II of the Americans with Disability Act (the "ADA"), (v) all defendants' liability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (the "RA"), and (vi) all defendants' liability for the violation of his right to full-time employment or on-the-job vocational training while incarcerated as guaranteed under Article I, Section .41 of the Oregon Constitution. On January 9, 2017, I dismissed Martin's Fourteenth Amendment, ADA, RA, and Oregon constitutional claims to the extent those claims were alleged against the College defendants.

         Now before the court is Martin's motion (#84) to compel interrogatory responses. I have considered the motion and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth below, Martin's motion to compel is granted, and the ODOC defendants are ordered to provide substantive responses to the two discovery requests within the scope of Martin's motion within fourteen days of the date hereof.

         LEGAL STANDARDS

         I. Scope of Permissible Discovery, Generally

         Federal Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(1) provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense - including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Rule specifies that "[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. However, the district courts should limit the scope of discovery under specified circumstances, as follows:

On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discoveiy in resolving the issues.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

         II. Motion to Compel

         As noted above, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(1) authorizes discoveiy regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. Rule 26(b)(1) is to be construed broadly, and encompasses any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that would bear on, any issue that is or may be ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.