Argued and Submitted August 15, 2013.
093367FE. Jackson County Circuit Court. Timothy C. Gerking, Judge.
Brian Michaels argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Michael A. Casper, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Christina M. Hutchins, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Before Duncan, Presiding Judge, and Haselton, Chief Judge, and Schuman, Senior Judge.[*]
[272 Or.App. 3] DUNCAN, P. J.
In this criminal case, defendant challenges the trial court's partial denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his consent to a search of his house and yard. As he did in the trial court, defendant argues that the state failed to prove that his consent was voluntary. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for errors of law, and we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact, provided they are supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence. State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66, 75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993). If the trial court did not make findings on particular issues and there is conflicting evidence in the record, " we will presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the court's ultimate conclusion." Id. (citation omitted).
After being charged with several drug crimes, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence police officers obtained as a result of their search of his house and yard. The officers did not have a warrant to conduct the search; they acted pursuant to defendant's consent. In the motion, defendant asserted that, when the officers asked him if he would consent to a search of his house and yard, he refused and said that he wanted to speak with an attorney, but the officers continued to ask him for consent, and, therefore, his subsequent written consent was " the result of officers overcoming his will[.]"  At the hearing on the motion, defendant also asserted that his consent was involuntary because, before he consented, the officers had stopped him without [272 Or.App. 4] reasonable suspicion by seizing his cell phone, " [s]o at that point any consent is inadmissible."
The trial court issued a written order denying the motion. In the order, the court set out its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Stated in accordance with the trial court's order, the relevant facts are as follows.
On the day of the challenged search, officers stopped a car driven by a man, Charlan. The car contained five pounds of marijuana and five pounds of hashish. Charlan told the officers that he was going to deliver the drugs to defendant in exchange for $20,000. Charlan also told the officers that he made his arrangements with defendant through another man, Alderete, who sold drugs for defendant.
At the officers' request, Charlan called Alderete to try to get either Alderete or defendant to make the exchange in public. Alderete told Charlan to bring the drugs to defendant's house. The officers then moved Charlan's car to a mall and had Charlan call Alderete and pretend that the car had broken down at the mall. Charlan did, and he told Alderete that he wanted ...