In the Matter of the Registered Domestic Partnership of: Karah Gretchen MADRONE, Petitioner-Respondent, and Lorrena Thompson MADRONE, Respondent-Appellant
Argued and Submitted November 4, 2014.
1201759CV. Klamath County Circuit Court. Dan Bunch, Judge.
John C. Howry argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Brett A. Baumann and Frohnmayer, Deatherage, Jamieson, Moore, Armosino & McGovern, P. C.
Thomas A. Bittner argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Mark Johnson Roberts and Gevurtz, Menashe, Larson & Howe, P. C.
Before Sercombe, Presiding Judge, and Hadlock, Judge, and Tookey, Judge.
[271 Or.App. 118] HADLOCK, J.
In this case, we consider how to determine whether an unmarried same-sex couple is similarly situated to a married opposite-sex couple for purposes of ORS 109.243 and, thus, entitled to the privilege granted by that statute. ORS 109.243 creates parentage in the husband of a woman who bears a child conceived by artificial insemination if the husband consented to that insemination. The statute's effect is automatic; it requires no judicial or administrative filings or proceedings. In Shineovich and Kemp, 229 Or.App. 670, 214 P.3d 29, rev den, 347 Or. 365, 222 P.3d 1091 (2009), we held that the statute violated Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution because it granted a privilege--parentage by operation of law--on the basis of sexual orientation, because it applied only to married couples and because, when we decided Shineovich, same-sex couples were not permitted to marry in Oregon. To remedy the violation, we extended the statute " so that it applies when the same-sex partner of the biological mother consented to the artificial insemination." Id. at 687. It was undisputed that the parties in Shineovich were similarly situated to a married opposite-sex couple, so we did not consider to which same-sex couples our extension of ORS 109.243 applies.
This case raises that question. During the parties' relationship, respondent gave birth to a daughter, R, who was conceived by artificial insemination. Shortly thereafter, the Oregon Family Fairness Act took effect, allowing samesex couples to register domestic partnerships, which petitioner and respondent then did. They later separated, and petitioner brought this action for dissolution of the domestic partnership. Among other claims, petitioner sought a declaration that she is R's legal parent by operation of ORS 109.243. The trial court granted summary judgment for petitioner on that claim based on our analysis in Shineovich. Respondent appeals. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that ORS 109.243 applies to unmarried same-sex couples who have a child through artificial insemination if the partner of the biological parent consented to the insemination and the couple would have chosen to marry had that choice been available to them. The record in this case includes evidence creating a genuine dispute on the latter [271 Or.App. 119] point. Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment, and we reverse.
The parties present fairly divergent views of the facts. Because this appeal comes to us following a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to respondent, the nonmoving party. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or. 404, 420, 939 P.2d 608 (1997). The parties, who are both women, met briefly in March 2004 in Oceanside, Oregon, where petitioner lived. Respondent, who lived in Colorado at the time, had recently been in a serious car accident that resulted in numerous injuries and required extensive rehabilitation. The parties corresponded after respondent returned to Colorado. Three months later, respondent returned to Oceanside for a week, during which the parties began a romantic relationship. They wanted to live together, and they moved to Colorado, where respondent continued her rehabilitation from the car accident.
During their time in Colorado, petitioner pressured respondent to hold a " commitment ceremony" with family and friends. The parties agreed that they did not want to seek a legal relationship, because they " did not believe in such social constructs" and " shared a common belief in freedom from marriage." Respondent was hesitant about having a commitment ceremony because petitioner was becoming more controlling of respondent and of their situation. Respondent took comfort in knowing that a ceremony would not be legally binding with respect to either the
parties' relationship or any children that either party might have. The parties believed that, if one of them had a child, the other would not automatically be recognized as a legal parent, and they " made no agreements of any kind that would be binding upon a child either of [them] chose to have * * *." They believed that, if they chose " to be parents together," they would have to take legal action to " make it official."
Notwithstanding respondent's reservations, the parties eventually agreed that they would have the commitment ceremony. Together, they chose and bought rings and dresses for the ceremony and registered for gifts. In mid-2005, respondent succumbed to pressure from petitioner to [271 Or.App. 120] move back to Oregon. The parties returned to Oceanside and held the commitment ceremony that September, as they had planned. Petitioner and respondent exchanged vows and rings at the ceremony. For several years thereafter, the parties had annual anniversary photos taken in the dresses that they had worn that day.
The month after the ceremony, the parties accepted joint positions managing the Clifftop Inn in Oceanside. They lived and worked at the inn, renovating the business and the premises. In March 2007, they bought the inn.
Respondent had wanted to have a child since before the parties met. By spring 2007, that desire had become urgent. She told petitioner that she " was going to have a child of [her] own no matter what." Respondent felt that it was her decision, and it did not matter to her whether she had the child with petitioner or not. Petitioner was initially hesitant about having a child at that time because she was concerned about the parties' financial stability and about the fact that working at the inn consumed so much of their time and energy. Respondent also had " mixed thoughts" about it, but they eventually " romanticized it and talked about doing it together." Respondent was concerned about having to " legally share" her baby with the biological father, so the parties decided to use two sperm donors in order to obscure the father's identity. Respondent wanted petitioner to be biologically related to the child, so she suggested asking petitioner's brothers if they would donate sperm. Only one of the brothers agreed, so respondent asked a friend of hers, and he agreed to be the other donor. A few days apart, the parties obtained the sperm donations and respondent was artificially inseminated. Petitioner assisted with the first insemination procedure but not the second. Respondent became pregnant.
The parties' relationship deteriorated during the pregnancy. Respondent gave birth to the baby, R, on January 21, 2008. By that point, respondent later asserted, the parties were " nothing more than 'roommates.'" After R was delivered, petitioner told respondent that she had not realized how hard it would be to not have a biological connection with the baby.
[271 Or.App. 121] Both parties legally changed their last names. Before R was born, respondent had often considered changing her own last name, and, having studied matrilineal societies, she wanted her daughter to have a " powerful, independent" last name. Respondent and petitioner both liked the name Madrone, and they agreed to give R that name. They both changed their last names to Madrone about two weeks after R was born, and it is the surname listed for R on her birth certificate.
The summary judgment record does not disclose who filled out R's birth certificate, but petitioner was not listed as a parent. Respondent did not attempt to put petitioner's name on the birth certificate, because she did not want petitioner to be R's legal parent. Respondent stated in an affidavit that she was " always clear that [she] was the legal, biological and SOLE guardian" of R. She also said, " I had the choice to add [petitioner] to my daughter's birth certificate, and I never did and never intended to." Petitioner never asked to have her name added. The parties were both aware that petitioner's name could be added to the birth certificate, but, in ...